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The main objective of this thesis is to identify the threats and the vulnerabilities concerning 
Takoradi port, and finally recommend measure to overcome the identified threats and vul-
nerabilities. Various categories of potential threats and vulnerabilities have been studied 
throughout the literature review. However, because each port presents a unique sets of 
threats and vulnerabilities, there was a need to look critically into how Takoradi port opera-
tions are being conducted in other to identity the potential threats and vulnerabilities per-
taining to the said port.  
 
This study applied Case Study Approach as a research strategy by using Qualitative research 
method as a means of exploring and understanding how individual or group ascribe to social 
or human problem, and also identify new theoretical propositions or managerial actions is 
needed. The empirical data for this study was collected through primary and secondary 
sources. With primary source, questionnaire, observation as well as informal discussion were 
used. Whereas with secondary source, raw data and publish summaries that have been col-
lected by organizations and individual, excluding researchers were used.  
 
The results of the study revealed the strength and the vulnerabilities within security system 
at the port of Takoradi. Apart from the strength and weaknesses, potential threats that con-
front the security systems, were also identified through the result. This thesis provides the 
recommendation needed to tackle the identified vulnerabilities and threats that are likely to 
disturb the effectiveness and efficient operating of the security systems. 
 
In the future, it is important to identify how human factor impact the successful implementa-
tion of port security measures. Further research in this particular area will help reduce the 
threat that human factor poses to the successful implementation of Port security measures  
 
 
Keywords: Threats, Vulnerabilities, Cargo Security, and Supply Chain Security   
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1 Introduction 
 
This section of the study presents a brief outline of the research, the problem and objective 
of the research. It goes further to explain research questions, delimitation and structure of 
the study. 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Thomas Friedman (2007,8) described in his book entitled, “The world is Flat”, that the inter-
connected global economy enabled by advances in Information and Communications Technol-
ogy and other factors that he terms “Flatteners”, does not only empowers the software writ-
ers and the computer geeks to collaborate on the work in the flat world, but also AL Qaeda 
and other terrorist networks. The playing field is not being levelled only in ways that draw in, 
and super empower a whole new group of innovators, but also a whole new group of angry, 
frustrated, and humiliated men and women”. Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD, Paris: July 2003) reported, “The world pattern for global prosperity has 
been predicated on near-frictionless transport and trade."  Seaport is a crucial component of 
the world economy and global transportation infrastructure, Nevertheless generally there 
hasn’t been a comprehensive governmental regulation and security oversight. The terrorist 
attacks of 11th September 2001 that collapsed the World Trade Centre and Pentagon in the 
United States, has significantly impacted multitude of sectors internationally. The tragic inci-
dent has brought radical change in the maritime industry. One of the major elements that 
arose in the response to that attack was the approach to security.  This change led to change 
in the manner in which security is being conducted and practiced, due to the numbers securi-
ty measures, rules as well as regulation to avoid such incident in the future.  International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) and U.S have implemented several measures after the tragic 
event, for the purpose of heightening the security of maritime business. For instance, Inter-
national Ships and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, was ratified by International Maritime 
Organization in 2002, and called on every member states to apply the code by 2004.  The 
Maritime Transportation Security Act 2002(MTSA) and the Security and Accountability for Eve-
ry port Act 2006(SAFE Port 2006) by United State was designed to improve national maritime 
security though, these two Act have international elements planned to strengthen security of 
the facilities by which Goods destined to United State are travelled. The main focuses were 
on the vulnerabilities of the ships and the port facilities, which could be exploited by the ter-
rorist and other criminals. Though the current security measures have enhanced some aspects 
of security at Takoradi port, yet some of the vulnerabilities, which are crucial, still hang out.  
The current regime has made security at the port very rigorous, for instance strict measures 
regarding containerized cargo. Port security measures could be infiltrated by terrorist or illic-
it traffickers, if appropriates mechanism are not put in place to verify identities, credentials, 
 9 
  
and the intention of individual, ships or cargo arriving at the port. This thesis shall define re-
search problem and the objective, then the issues relating to port security threats and the 
vulnerabilities, including its economic impacts on the port. Also how port security measures 
have been applied in Port of Takoradi shall be demonstrated. Though, current security regime 
have enhance some part of the port security, nevertheless they have failed to tackle the im-
portant vulnerabilities which terrorist and other criminals are capable of exploiting. Despite 
the fact that there is strong physical security at the ports, as well as the strict inspection 
rules for the containerized cargo, the absence of mechanisms to verify the identities and cre-
dentials of every individual who has access to the ports, secure non-containerized cargo, and 
prevent criminal from accessing and exploiting the port facilities, the whole port security 
measure can be undermined. 
 
1.2 Problem Discussion  
 
All sections within Ghana and international community have welcomed the breakthrough of 
offshore oil and gas in the Western part of Ghana. Ghanaians have is expectation that this 
breakthrough will bring significant economic benefit to Country. Takoradi Port being the main 
facility for receiving ships and transferring cargoes, the offshore oil and gas exploitation and 
development, has brought enormous responsibilities and challenges to the port Authorities 
and the users. The significant issues among, is how authority is going to manage the security, 
safety and environmental issues that will arise over the next decade. The challenge is that, 
offshore oil and gas extraction includes a complex net of ships, structures, installations and 
people, all interacting with each other. These activities raise concern to security, safety and 
environmental protection considerations at a high level of intensity, at this time that the off-
shore production is in full swing. Therefore there is the need to identify the related threats 
and vulnerability to be able to develop a comprehensive, but resilient security system to deal 
with the threats and vulnerabilities. 
 
1.3 Research Objectives  
 
The main objective of this thesis is to identify the threats and the vulnerabilities concerning 
Takoradi port in Ghana, and finally recommend measure to overcome the identified threats 
and vulnerabilities. 
 
1.4 Research Question 
 
The research has recognized, and seeks to answers the main question of “how to develop re-
silient security system for Takoradi Port?  This question came to mind after reading various 
concerns regarding the security of the maritime commerce. In trying to answer the main 
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question, the following question also came to mind: (ii) has there been any security incident 
linked to Takoradi Port? (ii) If yes, how many time are those incidents linked to Takoradi Port? 
(ii) How do those incidents happen? (iii) Are there in place, security measures to prevent 
those incidents?  (iv) Are those measures, effective to prevent potential security incidents? 
These prompted me to develop a questionnaire to search for the information regarding the 
existing security control measures, including vulnerabilities and threats associated with the 
security control measured, as well as operational activities within the port.  
 
1.5 Delimitation 
 
The theoretical part covers analysis of various literature sources that describe the interna-
tional maritime regulations and requirements for shipping industries and ports as well as the 
weaknesses and the strengths of the regulation.  Moreover, it shall describe the threats and 
the vulnerabilities regarding the shipping industries and the ports, including the competitive 
and economic impact on the ports. The theoretical framework shall be developed to describe 
the threat and vulnerabilities relating to the port and the measure to overcome the threat 
and vulnerabilities base on the literature review. The empirical part-case study will focus on 
the analysing the threats and vulnerabilities concerning Takoradi port. The case study will be 
restricted to only Takoradi Port. Other threats that can adversely impact the security system 
including the port operation shall be considered. For instance, threat from the supply chain.  
 
1.6 Thesis Chapter Structure 
 
Thesis is divided into Five (5) chapters. The chapter 1 presents the thesis background, the 
research problem,  objectives, research question as well as  delimitations.  Chapter 2, covers 
the review of various literature sources regarding the current maritime security measure for 
ships and ports, maritime and port security threats and vulnerabilities, supply chain/cargo 
security and it likely economic impact on the competitiveness on the port the.  Chapter 3 
contain the strategy and methods used in collecting the data. Chapter 4 contains profile of 
the Takoradi Port and Security Measures in place. Chapter 5 present the results, analysis of 
empirical data,conclusion and recommendations. 
 
2 The Theory 
 
This chapter presents the various theoretical conception to enable establish clearer under-
standing and knowledge regarding port security. 
 
2.1 Security Regulations and Requirements for Ships and Ports 
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The preceding chapter explains the thesis background and the problem, research objective 
and question, delimitation and the chapter structure. However, this part gives brief explana-
tions on the various regulations and requirements for ports and ships.  
Ships are a registered in their respective countries and for that matter has their own legal 
status. However, because they travel throughout the world and enter another country’s sea-
port, the port state has the right to enforce supervisory obligations on any ship that enters 
their waters as well as applying international requirements to which the flag state is signato-
ry. Regarding the regulatory requirement, there are international treaties and codes as well 
as national regulations related to security. The following are the main international treaties 
and code that influences the port states supervisory effort:   
 
We have 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (LOSC), which tackles the full 
range of legal issues affecting the seas and it’s relevant to both port and the flag states. Ex-
amples of issues are; environmental protection, regional cooperation, disputes resolution, 
territorial sea and many more. 
 
There is also 1948 International Maritime Organization Convention (IMOC) as a specialized 
group of the United Nations, which concentrates particularly on maritime issues such as ma-
rine safety, marine environmental protection, and marine security including marine legal sys-
tems. 
 
I974 International convention for the Safety of Life at Sea and its Protocol of 1978(SOLAS 
74/78), is convention intended to govern maritime safety and security, which form the basis 
for several port states regulations such as lifesaving requirements, navigational safety, crew 
licensing and competence as well as vessel management. Beside these, International Ship and 
Port security (ISPS) Code is also incorporated into the convention, which form the key stand-
ard for maritime security for ships and the ports.  
 
Last but not the least is the 1988 convention for suppression of unlawful Act against the safe-
ty of maritime Navigation (SUA). It has the following key element; first it empowers the coun-
try over any criminal or violent acts carried out on vessels based on the vessel flag, location 
or the nationality of the wrongdoer. Besides, it mandates the country with the given authority 
to either prosecute suspected wrongdoers or deport them to different location for prosecu-
tion. There is an added protocol that deal with the potentially terrorist related crimes. For 
instance using the ship as weapon or transporting terrorist, weapon of mass destruction or 
other related substances and cargo.  (Edgerton, M. 2013, 17-18)  
Some countries have developed their own internal legislation to improve the implementation 
of the port-state security obligations. However, for the sake of this project, the detail expla-
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nation shall not be given.  Below are some of the national regulations and legislative instru-
ments: 
 
UK Statutory Instrument No.1495: 2004: The ship and port facility security regulations 2004 
 
2002 US marine Transportation Security Act (US MTSA)  
 
Australian Maritime transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003(Australian MarSec Act)  
(Edgerton, M. 2013,19)  
 
2.2 International Ships and Ports Facility Security (ISPS) Code 
 
The previous section explained the security regulations and requirements for ships and ports. 
However this part briefly explains the International Ships and Port Facility Security (ISPS) 
Code, which is the current international regime for safeguarding international ships and port 
facility. It was introduced after the September 11 attacks on United States of America in 
2001. International community through convention agreed on the need to develop new securi-
ty regime to detect security threats and take preventive measures against security incidents 
affecting ships or port facilities used in international commerce. In respond to this threat, 
International Maritime Organization developed International Ship and Port Facility Code (ISPS) 
through co-operation among Governments, Government agencies, local administrations and 
shipping and port industries. An amendment was made to the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea Con-
vention (SOLAS) in 2002 to enhance maritime security (IMO.2002.SOLAS/CONF.5/31, 1). Inter-
national Ship and Port Facility Security (Code) is set of security measures to heighten the se-
curity of the Ships and Port Facilities, which was developed to respond to the potential 
threats to ships and ports facilities. The main derive of the ISPS code is to create a standard-
ized, consistent plan for analysing risk. This will assist governments to determine the right 
security levels with parallel security measure and to balance the changes in threats as well as 
changes in vulnerabilities for ships and port facilities.   (IMO.2004.IMO Security Measures)  
The ISPS code consists of two major parts: “A” and “B”. 
 
Part A of includes the detailed requirements for governments, port authorities and chipping 
companies, whereas Part B serves as guidance by which these requirement would be met, and 
it’s not mandatory. It includes series of resolutions adopted by the Conference for the pur-
pose of improving maritime security on board of ship, and at ship/port interface area. 
Measure to mitigate risk and responsibilities relating to the three levels of security are stipu-
lated in Part the A. The requirement also gives the state right to impose control and compli-
ance measures on any ship that visit the port. Contracting Governments are being mandated 
by the ISPS Code to take necessary or further action whenever the ISPS code make no provi-
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sion for such situation. Moreover, to better communicate the threat at the port facility or for 
a ship, ISP code requires Contracting Government to set appropriate security level. Security 
level 1(one) represent the normal threat situation. Whereas security level 2, represent medi-
um threat situation. Security level 3, represent high threat situation. ISPS demands both Ships 
and ports to develop security port plan based on the security assessment. It also requires both 
ships and Ports to have designated security officers who will deal with all the security related 
matters on behalf of their company or organization (IMO Briefing 42/2002). Regarding access 
to the Port Facility, under the section 16.12 of ISPS Code, Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) 
ought to establish each security level, means of identification, which is required to permit 
individual to enter the port facility and perform their respective functions without any diffi-
culties. These may require developing a proper identification system, which will permit per-
manent and temporary identifications for both regular staff of the port and visitors. 
 
Section 16.17, under security level 1, require Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) to establish 
the control points at restricted areas, which must be controlled by fencing or other barriers, 
up to a required standard for checking identification of individual, who wish to access the 
port facility to carr yout their respective assignment. Section18.4 under the ISPS Code stipu-
lates the requirement and the main objective for drill and Exercises. For port facility person-
nel to perform the assigned security duties, at all security levels, and be able to identify any 
shortfalls related to security, drill and exercises must be carried out at regular interval. Sec-
tion 18.5 of ISPS Code regard drill and exercises, require drill to be conducted at least quar-
terly, unless otherwise its influence by specific circumstances. It was stipulated under the 
Section18.5 of ISPS Code that, all form of exercises that involves the participation of port fa-
cility security officers, as well as relevant authorities of contracting governments, company 
security officers, or ship security officers, if possible ought to be conducted at least annually 
with no more than 18 months between the exercises. Because each port and the ship present 
unique and diverse risk, the contracting governments have the responsibility to comply with 
the ISPS Code measure that they believe it is right. Regarding SOLAS, IMO a body has no re-
sponsibility under the convention to monitor compliance; instead, the provision has been 
made for individual contracting government to adopt the rules into their national or local leg-
islation. Several international treaties have been designed to tackle the other aspect of mari-
time security as result of ISPS Code. For instance, security regarding merchant seamen is an-
other aspect to be dealt with in ensuring secured maritime security. To tackle the security 
issues whiles guaranteeing the right of global merchant seamen; International Labour Organi-
zation through convention in 2003 drafted the revised seafarer’s Identity Card, which was ap-
proved in 2004, to issue a standardized biometric ID card to the merchant seamen. (ILO-
london.2005) 
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2.3 Critiques of current Maritime Security Measures and Approach 
 
When developing policies for regulating international crime, it is very important to under-
stand neoliberal power in worldwide governance. There is the need to recognize the relation-
ship between biopolitics and neoliberalism to be able to construct a wider formation of laws 
and security strategies beyond the borders of the states. This is because there is fundamental 
relationship between development of procedures to regulate crime at international level and 
the establishment of the modern politico-economic theory, which favours free trade, minimal 
government intervention in business etc. Bio politics focus on protecting and caring for the 
wellbeing of the citizens. Whereas Neoliberalism emphasis on free trade, privatization, mini-
mal government intervention in business, reduced public expenditure on social services and 
so on. That is why controlling crime at global level requires the understanding of the relation-
ship or the features between biopolitics and neoliberalism, since they represent some key 
determinants factors for securing/protection of society through managing populations and 
their businesses and other properties (Nieto, D. 2012, 137-143). Notwithstanding that, consid-
eration must be given in respect to the resources and technical Know-how of the states, mul-
tinational actors, and economic interest. A country may be motivated to comply with or fol-
low international rules/policies due to lack of unilateral and bilateral law enforcement 
measures in the face of criminal activities that surpass national borders. Besides that, reli-
gious beliefs, humanitarian sentiments, fears, prejudices, paternalism, faith in universalism, 
the individual conscience, and the compulsion to proselytize could also be influential factors 
(Ethan A. Nadelmann.1990, 481). Nevertheless, it is not always the case as stated above, pos-
itive incentives rather than negative could also inspire a state to comply with international 
regulation or rules. Within the domain of port security, this could be true, “highly compliant 
companies could enjoys certain benefits such as, facilitated clearance arrangements, an enti-
tlement to self-assess, and reduced regulatory scrutiny, which provide compliant companies 
with the incentive to demonstrate their commitment to comply with regulatory require-
ments” (Widdowson, D & Holloway, S.2009, 20). 
 
Effective maritime security cannot be single out within the purview of International trade, 
since it affect and impacted by numerous external factors.  For instance, socioeconomic driv-
ers, political priorities, transportation-system connected to business trends, as well as inter-
national event. Therefore, risk-based approach to security is vital when developing maritime 
security policies to regulate international commerce. Moreover, due to the complex nature 
regarding the interaction of port and ships, in addition to other economic interest, logistics, 
and transportation modes within the purview of maritime, security must be seen as element 
of system resilience and risk management (Edgerton, M. 2013, 141).  So, in the process of de-
vising security measures to regulate maritime business, adoption of credible risk management 
tactics is necessary to balance the commercial and security needs.  Such security measures 
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must be selected based on carefully analysis. The right way to make these selections is by 
comparing the benefits of less- frequent, less-extreme terrorist events to the costs of security 
measures, direct and the indirect cost, as well as loses that arises as a result of long waiting 
lines at the port. For security measure to be considered efficient, marginal benefits must be 
equal or exceed marginal costs (Jon, D. Haveman & Howard, J. Shatz.2006 31). 
 
When security strategies and measures are skillfully and appropriately designed, it functions 
as enablers, which permit constant cost-effective and reliable operation of industries, gov-
ernment services, and economies. Habitually, security is seen as a cost center in the com-
mercial setting, nevertheless an approach whereby security is incorporated into daily business 
operation, security could be guaranteed, thus, offer resilience service to minimize the cost of 
disruption, and at the same time, reliability would be maximized as well as competitiveness 
of business operations” (Edgerton, M. 2013, 141). One of the major concerns by the maritime 
industries after the introduction of ISPS code was the economic impact that the new security 
measures would bring to their business operation, despite the fact that they agreed and wel-
come the need for tougher security measures (Wade, J. 2005, 41). 
Another challenging and critical issues ahead of international maritime community is how the 
new security regime would be financed, and it effects on the maritime business. Neverthe-
less, same things, which have allow economic growth in maritime transport, also makes it 
vulnerable to be exploited by criminals or terrorist groups. The challenges that the shipping 
community would be facing are both immediate and long-term, in respect to the implementa-
tion of ISPS code. Among the various challenges is the costs of financing ISPS code implemen-
tation, and it commercial impacts on the different stages of their implementation (Alexandros 
and Agisilaos.2005, 472). 
 
Despite some concerns about the costs of implementing ISPS code, there has been significant 
development in the global maritime commerce as a result of introducing ISPS code. According 
to Bichou, K. (2004,323) “International Ships and Port facility Security (ISPS) code is the most 
important global security initiatives ever, with impacts affecting the entire international 
shipping industry and beyond. “Though ISPS code has deeply impacted the entire maritime 
commerce, but since IMO has limited power to force the sovereign states to secure their 
ports, the term “port facility”, which signify the area where vessels are covered by SOLAS, 
was created for the purpose of implementing ISPS code requirements. But it left to the IMO 
member state to declare which area of its ports falls within port facilities, which will be af-
fected by the security requirements ”(Nuthall, K., Fine, P., & Thomson, J. 2003, 84–87). 
 
Even though some people argue that ISPS code and other post -2001 programs have positively 
impacted maritime commerce in one way or the other, nevertheless the code lack certainty, 
because of that, the organizations do not apply the policy and procedures up to the standard 
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requirements. For instance, instead of applying the technology, they use existing manpower. 
Considering the challenges in controlling such a large volume of people and vehicle in and out 
of the port, inspection of cargo, in addition to constant costly issues regarding waterside se-
curity. (Botelho, R. 2004, 18). Obviously the current regime does not address the wider secu-
rity concern of the maritime commerce. According to Shah, S. K. (2004,32) “ISPS code may be 
good start to protect international shipping against physical terrorist attacks, but what ap-
pears to be missing is an emphasis on safeguards against vulnerabilities associated with in-
formation systems and technology.” 
 
The current maritime security measures do not tackle non-seaborne or Pier-side vulnerabili-
ties related to the information system and the technology. Computers and communications 
system are the strength of modern-day business. Many activities in the international maritime 
commerce could not be successfully done without efficiency computer and communication 
networks. So, any attempt to ignore it, when safeguarding international maritime commerce, 
will make the maritime business vulnerable to be exploited by criminals or terrorists. For ex-
ample, Terrorists may use a port’s computer information systems to locate hazardous cargoes 
for their subsequent destruction.  From the study of port security incident cycle, the follow-
ing four different categories of potential port security incidents were identified: “Waterside, 
Landside, Employee and Information-release related” (C. Ariel Pinto and Wayne K. Talley, 
2006, 270). 
 
According to Michael Edgerton (2013), ISPS Code is “reasonably effective initial step in estab-
lishing low-low base line security in global shipping. It is because of the drastic differences in 
size, technological development, and resources available to ports, administrations and ship-
ping companies around the world.”  Many are of the view that, U.S government has per-
formed well in harmonizing the need for improved supply chain security, and the concerns of 
the industry’s business. Nevertheless, some main concerns still remain (Thibault, M., Brooks, 
M. R., & Button, K. J. 2006, 13). Several concerns have been raised regarding the effective-
ness of the new regime in securing the international supply chain, and their impact on cross-
border commerce, whether the benefit of compliance will balance or outweigh the cost of 
implementing the program. For example, one of the concerns was fact that, ISPS Code’s does 
not apply to fishing vessels and vessel with cargo not above 500 tones, meanwhile those ves-
sels could be used for Piracy, smuggling of people and/or illegal goods (drugs, firearms, alco-
hol, etc.) and stowaways (John P. Hogan & Chapman, L. 2005, 24). 
 
Primarily, ISPS Code do not address the supply-chain security concerns as the crucial security 
issues regarding maritime commerce, it emphases is on external threats. Because it attention 
is on the external threat, the criminals or terrorist could capitalizes on the vulnerabilities 
within internal security system to launch criminal activity or terrorist act. In addition ISPS 
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code mainly places and externally mandatory set of conditions on port and shipping compa-
nies, nevertheless does not inspire the development of security culture alongside daily opera-
tions, and within the organizational structure. Besides, there is absence of enticement for 
organizations that partaking beyond the minimum requirements of the code (Edgerton, M. 
(2013, 110–111). Several writings have identified some lapses within the current maritime se-
curity regime, pointing to the fact that, International Maritime Organization is unable to en-
force the new maritime regulations, but can only monitor compliance. Simply because, ac-
cording to Flynn, S. E. (2007), “ISPS compliance lies largely in the eye of the beholder, where 
each nation is allowed to determine whether its vessels or port facilities are up to par.”  The 
implementation of ISPS programs has encountered some difficulties. Accoding to International 
Maritime Organization (IMO), the last minute for the new regulations to be effected in 2004, 
“only 53 % of the world's shipping fleet had the security certificates to carry; with the same 
proportion of ports had the officially approved security plans that,” (Perils on the sea. O7 
July 2004,). With all the substantial amount resources spent on the ISPS Code implementa-
tion, the Code has been unsuccessful. In practice, it’s the crew that ensures actual security of 
the vessel, and so, the number of the crew should have been increased, after the initiation of 
ISPS Code, but that was not the case. The situation turn to be the other way round, as ship-
owners demands the cost reduction by cutting down crew sizes. This is contrarily to the life 
force of the Code as initially envisaged (Bateman, S. 2009, 115). It may be unfair to focus on 
only the shortcoming of ISPS code. The report by OECD in 2003 on Security of Maritime 
Transport claimed, the benefit that comes from reduced delays, faster processing times, bet-
ter asset control, and decreased payroll due to IT improvements, fewer losses due to theft, 
decreased insurance costs, and many more cannot be overlooked. In fact, some of the 
measures may slow the operations nevertheless many others may reduce trade costs. In an 
organization where there is much dependent on paper and fax transmissions, the savings that 
may accrued from more IT integrated system cannot be covered. Many more manufactures 
and shippers have already achieved much from increased productivity as result integrating IT 
in their supply Chain. Customs authorities, port and terminal operators are not excluded.  
 
Some countries perceive the current maritime security regime as expensive, and for this rea-
son they feel reluctant in complying with, for example China. It could also be that the per-
ceived cost or how expensive the new security requirement is, may be reflected by the extent 
to which the country or the port view itself as a terrorist target. Nevertheless the cost of suc-
cessful attack against the vital component of maritime trade such as oil transportation and 
other critical infrastructure could be much more than the cost of inaction (Perils on the sea; 
2004).  
 
Moreover, the International Chamber of Shipping claimed that, “the whole package of US leg-
islation is potentially trade disruptive.” In their opinion, there is the need for maritime secu-
 18 
  
rity framework that avoids costly information sharing and exchange, including privacy protec-
tion pitfalls implied by the US approach (Stasinopoulos, D. 2003, 318). United States (U.S) and 
international initiative is just an additional rule, procedures, and technology to improve secu-
rity, whereas ways that people enter and operate within maritime system have not been 
changed (Harrald, J. R.2005, 175). One of main concern regarding the developing countries is 
that, the cost involved in acquiring technology and technical know-how for the implementa-
tion of ISPS and CSI, will prevent the small entities within developing countries, from compet-
ing in global trade.  Survey conducted by International Association of Ports and Harbors (IAPH) 
among its member ports demonstrated some challenges. “70 % out of 53 member ports, which 
responded to the survey, were confident they would meet the deadline of July 1, 2004, 19 % 
were uncertain. The reason cited was due to financial constraints, lack of staff and expertise, 
and delay in legislative enactment and procedures by governing bodies and authorities”. Ac-
cording to report, smaller ports and ports from developing nations called for information 
sharing and technical assistance, including guidelines, models and samples, as well as finan-
cial assistance, through the establishment of a funding plan to raise public finance for devel-
oping countries.” (UNCTAD 2004, 20–34). 
 
According Dr. Ikokide Zebulon (2014), Nigeria Port Authority started the implementation ISPS 
code on 1st July 2014, meanwhile ISPS code was supposed to be implemented since 2004, af-
ter the introduction. This was due to lack technical know-how, capacity and willingness to 
implement the measures.  Report from the audit conducted by U.S government Anti-Terrorism 
Assistance in Kenya and Mozambique, in 2007 indicated that, both states needed to improve 
their port security standard, because their facility does not meet the standard for which suc-
cessful implementation of ISPS code can be done (Kennedy, F. 2007).   According to Langew-
iesche, W (2004,7) “It is not by accident that the more high-level technology pirate group and 
terrorist appear to imitate the operational techniques and method of ship owners, though 
their incentive and ideologies are different. Certainly, they have learnt to work without the 
need for home base, and most importantly to escape the forces of order not by running away, 
but complying with the laws and regulations to be able to move freely and to hide in the plain 
sight. Should they choose to comply with the new laws and regulations in order to move 
freely and to hide in the plain sight for their own gain, without a doubt, the ways and the 
manner in which ISPS has been implemented might be irrelevant.” A research conducted 
about Port and Supply-chain Security Initiative in United States and abroad claimed that the 
people involved in the implementation of these recent initiatives have voiced out their dis-
tress regarding increased workloads, difficulty understanding the code, and communication 
difficulties, due to numerous acronyms and longer hours. However it was argued that these 
anxieties are temporal. Nevertheless, there is the need to improve upon ISPS with further 
legislation to ensure successful implementation of a standardized biometric identification 
card and the improvement of information gathering and sharing to target perpetrators with-
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out disturbing the whole supply chain. Moreover, there should be ways to increase worldwide 
awareness, so that countries can understand benefits from ISPS compliance.  (Lyndon B. John-
son.2006, 55) 
 
Similar studies were conducted in the Caribbean region to find out whether the adoption and 
implementation of the International ships and Port Facility Security (ISPS) would have a 
measurable impact on the productivity on the port. It was discovered that there were some 
challenges when implementing the requirements of the Code. Apart from that, it is expensive 
for ports and shipping lines. Nevertheless physical improvement has been made regarding the 
security personnel, as result of better training, and procedures such as, access and documen-
tation. Moreover, following the implementation of ISPS Code, the port has experiencing in-
creased in productivity, which probably as a result of improved access control and surveil-
lance, which directly affected the theft cases (Linda, T. B.2006, 68). According to 2010 report 
published by United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD.2010,8) regard-
ing the Emerging challenges, and recent developments affecting transport and trade facilita-
tion, “amendments of Safe Of Life At Sea (SOLAS) and International Ships and Port Security 
(ISPS) Code imposes an extensive responsibilities on governments, shipping companies, and 
port facilities.” Implementing new security requirements effectively shall face both immedi-
ate and long-term challenges, especially from the perspective of developing countries. 
Though it has been accepted that the new regime will improve security in maritime transport 
and across the supply chain, nevertheless the cost associated with the security measures will 
impact the cost of doing business. The concern by developing countries is that any extra cost 
burden will hinder the progress of the maritime and supply chain business.  
 
As far as the cost of implementing SOLAS and ISPS Code is concerned, the prevailing global 
estimated cost by UNCTAD for the implementation of ISPS Code in ports ranges between near-
ly $1.1 billion and $2.3 billion as a start-up cost, and between approximated amount of $0.4 
billion and $0.9 billion annually thereafter. Nearly the same as increase in the international 
maritime freight payments of about 1 %, with regards to the initial expenditure, and 0.5 % 
with annual expenditure respectively. These seem very small though; these costs are too high 
for smaller ports in developing countries (UNCTAD.2010, 8). T he figure 1 simplified the over-
all assessment of the impact of ISPS Code survey, conducted by United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development in 2007. Based on the respondent ports; 64 % of the respondent said 
ISPS Code had an overall positive impact as it provided a mechanism to standardize security 
at all facilities under ports' jurisdiction. 24 % of the respondent said, ISPS Code is seen as hav-
ing negative implications. These include being too expensive, burdensome, including causing 
distraction to regular business operation. 12 % were of the view that ISPS Code has partial 
impact, because of the prior investments made before implementation of ISPS Code in order 
to prevent theft and other criminal practices.  
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Figure 1 
 
(UNCTAD secretariat.2007, 26) 
 
Considering the strengths and weaknesses of the current maritime security regime, it effec-
tiveness can be measured base on its ability to address the maritime security risk areas of 
cargo, vessels, people and money. (McNaught F. & RAN. 2005, 94) 
 
2.4 Port Security threats 
 
The term “threat”, in most cases misunderstood by many people, therefore being used inter-
changeably with other terms like “risk” or vulnerability. Hence, to be able to prevent or insti-
tute measures to safeguard against the threat, clearer understanding of the term “threat” is 
very important. The term threat could be defines as an act or actor that may bring harm or 
damage to a country, organization, person, or facility (Edgerton, M. 2013, 47). 
Alternatively, it is an “expression, by any means of communication (Witten, verbal, body lan-
guage, etc.), of the intention to inflict or cause some type of harm against a person, group, 
building or other entity.”  Obviously, from these two definitions, the central element of the 
threat is action or the potential for action. It may be a threat of death, physical harm, politi-
cal harm or legal or an unspecified/unarticulated harmful action. Threat probably is as result 
of natural occurrence like earthquakes and flood, accidents or intentional act to inflict harm.  
Based on the context of maritime security, threat consist of possible harmful or damaging 
activities carried out by nation-states and their proxies and/ terrorist and criminal groups or 
individual not acting on behalf a nation.” However, for the purpose of this study I will dwell 
on only “terrorism and criminal activities”. 
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2.4.1 Terrorism  
 
Terrorism is up to date a big threat globally. It does not matter what causes it, or how it is 
being carried out, it is a crime, which cannot be justified or given an excuse. Terrorism is not 
a threat to one particular region, country or society, rather a threat to each individual’s 
right. Though there is no globally approved standard definition for “terrorism” it is perceived 
generally as deliberate assault on civilians with the aim of intimidating people or forcing a 
state or global establishment to take certain action or abstaining from certain action  
Typical examples are Boko Haram in Nigeria, and Al-Shabab in Kenya and Somalia. 
 
2.4.2 Criminal Activities 
 
Criminal activities includes the following actions; smuggling, theft, corruption, trade-
regulation violations, and any action other illegal activity found in the maritime or port do-
main.  Below is the list of examples: cargo theft, robbery, extortion, trafficking of people, 
drugs, stolen goods, weapons, or money Hijacking of vessel of vehicles, Embargo violations  
Customs violations 
 
2.4.3 Cargo theft 
 
Cargo theft is well paid and occur day in day out, throughout the world. It was reported in 
2010 that, the loss as a result of cargo theft in US was nearly 171 million dollars. (Edgerton, 
M. 2013, 62-63). Ghana’s supply chain, those that moves by the country’s seaports especially 
is wrought with cargo theft. The local freight forwarders called it a “silent” crime. Cargo 
theft costs the Ghanaian economy several million cedi’s annually. (GIFF Secretariat)  Despites 
the fact that there no reliable crime statistics on cargo theft locally, approximately, it was 
indicated that West Africa countries have the uppermost risk of cargo theft on the entire con-
tinent of Africa (Burges, Global risk, 2009 .47). Globally, the theft of goods in transit ex-
pected to reach 50 billing dollars a year or more. According to law enforcement agencies, 
half of the cargo theft cases have not been reported, and if reported it the figure may even 
exceed 100 billion dollars annually. Sometimes robbery forms part of the tactics used in cargo 
theft. Particularly, cargo hijackings  
2.4.4 Extortion 
 
Extortion involves illegal activities through criminal organizations in the ports and their envi-
ronment, whereby usually citizens who obey the laws are coercing to offer material, services, 
or money to organized criminal groups. 
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2.4.5 Trafficking 
  
Trafficking is one out of everyday crimes found in seaports and maritime domain. It includes 
trafficking or smuggling of persons, money, drugs, weapons, or other contraband goods. 
Some smugglers use the proceeds from the trafficking or smuggling to support terrorism. “For 
example in December 2011, a Lebanese man named Ayman “Junior” Joumaa was indicted in 
United States of America for smuggling cocaine and laundering money as part of an intricate 
plot that involved both raising money for Hezbollah and laundering money for Mexican “Zeta” 
drug cartel.” Vessels hijacking are usually connected to piracy and is a criminal activity. Cur-
rently, Somali pirates hijacked commercial ships and as well as cargo ships and tankers, they 
released the vessels after millions of dollars have been paid.  
 
2.4.6 Corruption 
 
According to Schreier, F. 201. (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces), 
“Corruption may be defined as soliciting or accepting, promising, offering or granting an un-
due advantage for the commission or non-commission of an action.” To be able to growing a 
successful sustainable business requires the following: an uncompromising devotion to devel-
oping products and services that contribute real value to the client; passionate leadership 
that attracts and inspires the best to join the venture; and an unwavering commitment to act 
as a responsible player in the community, nurturing public trust and support on which all 
businesses eventually depend. Corruption erodes each of these pillars of business success. It 
means three things: cutting corners and shirking honest competition rather than producing 
real value for the clients; compromising corporate and individual integrity, deterring and de-
motivating the best and most innovative entrepreneurs and scientists from signing on; and 
consenting to, and propping up, a business environment in which complicity is for sale, en-
trusted public power is routinely abused for the sake of private gain, and public trust in the 
beneficial partnership between business and society is slowly uncompleted.  The action of 
corruption can be active or passive. Promising or offering an individual undue advantage is 
what is refers to as active corruption, whereas passive corruption can be soliciting or accept-
ing this kind of benefit. The following can be described as some of the corrupt act; bribery, 
graft, sweetheart deals, political payoffs, influences peddling, cronyism, patronage, nepotism 
and so on.  Lobbyism emerges as modern form corruption, which has more than about 20,000 
Lobbyist in Washington D.C. and 15,000 in Brussels and many more in the world. (Schreier, F. 
(DCAF), 2010, 57)   Mostly, the economic, social and administrative factors initiate and open 
way for corruption. For instance Low salary workers may be influence to earn supplementary 
income from corrupt means. Hiring, job advancement or promotion, which is based on more 
connections and payoffs instead of merit, also contribute to corruption. Such actions decreas-
es professionalism and competence of the bureaucracy, thus solidifies the cycle of corruption. 
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Corruption promotes smuggling, misappropriation of public funds, tax and customs revenue, 
extortion and fraudulent award of public procurement contract. 
    
2.4.7 Stowaway  
 
A stowaway is an individual who hide on a ship, or in cargo, or in a container which is then 
loaded on onto the ship without the ship-owner or master’s permission, remains on-board the 
ship when she leave the port. Stowaway is perceived to be long-standing threat for shipping 
companies specifically those that have been doing business on the coast of West Africa, in 
Central America, Colombia, Venezuela as well as Dominican Republic. Apart from the Vessel’s 
patterns of trade, this threat is also connected to the vessel and /or cargo type including se-
curity training and awareness of the crew. The majority of stowaway is normally found on 
container, bulk and general cargo vessels. The International Group of P&I club gathered stow-
away case from 20th February 2011 to 20 February 2012 totals of 774 incidents including 1,640 
stowaways. Meanwhile, there has been minor decrease in the number of incidents, by com-
paring the time period from 20th February 2007 to 20 February 2008 that recorded 842 inci-
dents including 1,955 stowaways. From the data, though there has been decreased, but it’s 
not substantial amount. On the bases of nationality of stowaways, the IG data shows that, the 
margin of the stowaway were from Africans, particularly Ghana, Nigeria and Tanzania as indi-
cated in table 1 below. As indicated through table 1, Ghana leads in term of highest number 
of stowaway per country, while Sierra Leone is the least on the top ten of the table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
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Source: I:\FAL\38\6-2.doc, 3 
 
By comparing 2011-2012 and that of 2007-2008, table 2 shows very slid shift in nationalities of 
stowaways  
 
Table 2 
 
Source: I:\FAL\38\6-2.doc, 4 
 
Regarding the port of embarkation, the International Group of P&I Club data, for 2011-2012 
shows that the top ten port of embarkation based on number of reported cases are in Africa, 
mostly West part of the continent been painted on table 3 and 4 below 
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Table 3 
 
 
Source: I:\FAL\38\6-2.doc, 5 
 
Figure 1. Table 4 
 
 
Source: I:\FAL\38\6-2.doc, 6 
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Based on table 4, the data from 2011-2012, if compare to the 2007-2008 data, there isn’t any 
substantial amount of differences in terms of the stowaways’ nationalities, port of embarka-
tion and number of stowaways. 
 
 Figure 2 
 
Stowaways are normally found in a specific type of ships, and as indicated in figure 1 above, 
container ship carries the highest percentage of stowaway due to it multipurpose type of ship 
and consistency in trade. Bulk carriers, car carriers, and general cargo and Ro-Ro ships also 
carries considerable number percentage. (SPENCER, C .209,2)  
 
2.4.8 Human factor as a threat 
 
Considering the threats and vulnerabilities regarding port security, human factor cannot be 
overlooked, when implementing security measures or safeguards. This is because human fac-
tor can serve as an obstacle to the successful implementation of the security measures. Pre-
venting internal threat to security is one of the most challenging and complex task facing se-
curity and law enforcement at the port, because of employees’ unique access to vessels and 
the infrastructure with the port. Example restricted access area of the port. This places a 
difficult challenge on the security manager to prevent unauthorized access to the port (Chris-
topher, K .2014, 64) Modern day security has been considered to be more or less technical 
field, yet it is important to know how human affect security measures or safeguards. Human 
problem are the vital part of security. Most often than not, security is regarded as technolo-
gy, nevertheless, it is always concerns human beings. Security exists because of human being 
and for that matter; people are the center of any security defiance or breach.  Even though, 
technology helps both the attacker and the defender in deferent ways, nevertheless security 
is basically about people. The port users and other individuals may follow the best and re-
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quired security practice recommended by the ISPS Code and the security experts, install the 
needed security products, with complete vigilant regarding the security systems, still individ-
uals are still vulnerable. Why? According to Kevin D. Mitnick William L. Simon (2002) “the hu-
man factor is truly security weakest link. One of the worlds most renowned scientist of the 
twentieth century, Albert Einstein, said, “Only two things are infinite, the universe and hu-
man stupidity, and I am not sure about the former.”  Criminals can infiltrate the security sys-
tem and succeed when people are corrupt or ignorant regarding good security practice. “Any-
one who thinks that a security product alone offers true security is settling for the illusion of 
security”.  Such people should anticipate for future security incident. According to Security 
consultant Bruce Schneier (2008), “Security is not a product, it’s a process.” “Further security 
is not a technology problem it’s a people and management problem.” According to Bruce 
Schneier, (2008) “Security is both a feeling and a reality. And they're not the same.” Person-
ality and Behavior are the most persistent hindrances to teamwork in organization interper-
sonal conflict. Most conflicts are established in various personality traits.  
Kabay, M. E (2002) presented the following example as a set of categories for describing peo-
ple’s personalities: 
 
a. Extroversion 
• High: active, assertive, energetic, outgoing, and talkative 
• Low: quiet, reserved, shy, silent, and withdrawn 
 
b. Agreeableness 
• High: affectionate, appreciative, kind, soft-hearted, sympathetic 
• Low: cold, fault-finding, hard-hearted, quarrelsome, and unfriendly 
c. Conscientiousness 
• High: efficient, organized, responsible, and thorough 
• Low: careless, disorderly, frivolous, irresponsible, and slipshod 
 
d. Emotional stability 
• High: calm, contented, stable, and unemotional 
• Low: anxious, moody, nervous, tense, and worrying 
 
e. Openness  
• High: imaginative, insightful, intelligent, original, wide interests 
• Low: commonplace, shallow, simple, narrow interests, unintelligent 
 
Some Peoples assume some kind of personality trait as superior and this affect communication 
among colleagues.  For example, people with “low” characteristics might perceive the above, 
might be a hindrance to team work in an organization, which will definitely impact the organ-
ization security system negatively. 
 
Personality traits often cause conflict more than problems of understanding. If the team rec-
ommends that all the staff or employees must challenge or defy individual who is found inside 
the port premises or within port facility without badge or protective cloth, person with low 
extroversion as stated below, for instance may find it difficult regarding the notion that they 
should inform individual what to do, particularly if the person is his Boss or of superior ran.    
 
f. Extroversion 
• High: nervous, aggressive, excitable, pushy, chattering 
• Low: dignified, respectful, unassuming, attentive, self-sufficient  
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g. Agreeableness 
• High: clinging, gushy, soft-headed, knee-jerk reactive, uncritical  
• Low: stately, analytical, rational, principled, reserved  
h. Conscientiousness 
• High: obsessive, compulsive, unspontaneous, pompous, slavish 
• Low: free, spontaneous, creative, fun, youthful, having perspective  
 
i. Emotional stability 
• High: frozen, ambitionless, boring, dead  
• Low: vibrant, romantic, alive, strong, sensible  
j. Openness or Culturedness  
• High: flaky, theoretical, complicated, off-the-wall, dilettante  
• Low: earthy, smart, grounded, focused, practical  
 
John Leach (2003) observes two sets of factors, which changes the employee behavior. The 
first set comprises user knowledge regarding what the company hopes from the employee and 
second sets includes factors that empower the willingness of the employee to conduct him or 
herself within acceptable and approved standards and practices of the company. Figure 3 il-
lustrates the two sets of influential factors.  Leach specifies that human knowledge is based 
on what they are told, what they see practice around them and their past experience. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3, Factors That Influences Security Behaviour 
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With regards to what Employee have are told, several companies have documented security 
policies, practices, standards and procedures. The effectiveness to influence the security be-
havior depends on the body of Knowledge accessibility, the completeness of its coverage, 
clarity of the stated security values and its uniformity. 
 
Again with respect to what employees see practice around them, the existing employee or 
new employee who want to comport him or herself in conformity with company norms and 
practices, are commonly motivated by what they see being practice by their peers or superi-
or. Mostly, employees are seriously influenced especially, based on their superiors’ attitude 
and behavior towards the security norms and practices of their work environment.  
 
When it comes to employees past experience, sometime not all the security policies and pro-
cedure are expressly documented, some are implied, even some may not made know until 
certain circumstance, and so, employees at that situation may take their own security deci-
sion as part of their daily task based on their previous knowledge and experience before even 
they are expressly stated or build up.    
 
According to Leach (2003) willingness is based on personal values and standards, sense of ob-
ligation and degree of difficulty. Even though, employee can   to take up and apply the organ-
ization’s system of values and standards, with comfort, it possible they may be demotivated 
or tensions, and this possibly arise when there is conflict of interest between the individual’s 
values and standards with that of organization’s own believes and standards. If that hap-
pened, individuals turn to follow their own values and standards. 
 
Apart from personal values and standards, every employee has a sense of obligation (psycho-
logical contract) with the company or the employer he or she works for, which forces him/her 
to act in accordance with company expectations, voluntarily to restrain their behavior to be 
within the bounds of accepted practice, particularly if individual feels well treated, recog-
nized and rewarded by the employer. Nevertheless, if employee feel he or she have been 
treated unjustly by their employer in any aspect of his/her employment relationship, he or 
she will feel that the bonds have been breached or loosened and when that happens the em-
ployee can lose the willingness to act in the company’s best interests or employee will feels 
the employer have been unfair to him/her and that will cause the employee to feel angry so 
that he or she will wish to punish the company. When that happens, then the employee be-
comes the company’s security enemy and that will stands as a major security threats. Hence 
the sense of obligation towards employer impact behavior. 
Last but not the least, levels of difficulties employees encounter in complying with the com-
pany’s policies and procedures also impact behavior.  If the security countermeasures are dif-
ficult to perform or are operationally burdensome, the controls appear to be ineffective and 
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inefficient; the employee may have little tolerance to comply even if the employee recogniz-
es that the security countermeasures are implemented for good reasons.  
2.4.9 Economic Espionage  
 
When there is a competition among the private sector companies, some may try to steal trade 
secret or confidential information, including compromise business practices to get economic 
advantage. Seaport is not out of target location for espionage activities due to the confluence 
of private sector trade, transportation, and import /export interest. (Christopher, K .2014, 
69)  
  
2.4.10 Poorly train security personnel  
 
If the staff responsible port security lack adequate training there is higher possibility that for 
crime and infiltration by internal conspiracies. (Christopher, K .2014, 68)   
 
2.5 Ports, Ships and Supply Chain Vulnerabilities 
 
Despite the effort by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to prevent crime and ter-
rorism against maritime commerce by introducing ISPS Code and other programs, criminal 
activities still occur day in day out through various seaports. With all the measure and pro-
grams in place, criminals still find their way out with their nefarious activities, due to the 
vulnerabilities that present themselves within the supply chain and the seaport. Ports are re-
ally complex and particularly vulnerable, and very important to global trade. From a security 
perspective, ports always need to be assessed from the following dimensions: target, conduit, 
and border. Moreover, ports are critical node within the global maritime transportation sys-
tem because they are fixed, permanent locations, which make it more vulnerable and less 
easily replaced than other elements. Port is a target, because it serves as a link between land 
transportation and maritime trade routes, and has since been identified as strategically im-
portant target. It forms a single point of failure for Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC), and 
due to its unique characteristics or geographic locations, it difficult or impossible to replace. 
Moreover, it serves to convey cargo or goods into foreseeable and known storage area. For 
Example, containers yard or shed. Thus permit potential attackers or criminals to readily lo-
cate potential cargo for theft or damage. It serves as a conduit, because it purposes is to help 
bring a full range of goods and services to people globally. As distribution and receiving of 
goods and services taking place, it creates vulnerability to be exploited by criminal groups, 
terrorists, or state actors for importation and exportation of illicit material into the country.  
Nearly 90 per cent of global trade passes through sea, everything from raw materials to au-
tomobiles, clothing as well as high-end electronics.  This high volume of cargo that passes 
through the port bring many challenges to government and other bodies that have been 
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tasked to ensure safe and secure transportation of cargoes, globally. What makes it more 
challenging is, increase in just-in-time delivery, whereby a movement of huge amount of car-
go as quickly as possible passes through the port to their intended destination of delivery.  
This creates significant vulnerabilities in the security of the cargo and the port by which that 
cargo transit. The vulnerabilities that the ports as channel face are, cargo theft and smug-
gling of banned goods or people out of the port. (Edgerton, M. 2013, 34-43) 
 
2.5.1 The Three Critical Flow Of International Trade Cargo 
 
This part observes the main flows connected to the process or the movement of maritime 
cargo in broader broader scale, especially the containerized cargo. In this modern day, most 
of the global trade passes through sea, from raw materials to automobiles, clothing as well as 
high-end electronics. The maritime journey is just a single element in a complex chain. Re-
garding a typical door-to-door journey whereby goods are shipped using container, involve 
different actors, documents, who interact with each other through divers means, and be han-
dled at several physical locations. The system of people, their interaction, movements, and 
information connected to the transnational movement of goods can be categorized into the 
following: Movement of goods from place to place, Movement of custody from person to per-
son, Movement of information regarding the cargo 
 
2.5.1.1 Place and Process 
 
In the first place the chain comprises the physical process of moving cargo from one place to 
another, and from one process to another process.  Security view this chain is very physical, 
and so, immediately there is feeling of suspicions or established fact, threats can be pin-
pointed down this chain, and necessary steps can be taken to physically counteract the 
threat. Once you know where the shipment started, it mode of transportation and the partic-
ular places it passed, whether the integrity of the chain have been compromised or not. The 
security staffs or security agencies that want to stop threatening cargo must begin to probe or 
ask questions.  Issues relating container cargo security can be simplified under the following 
stages:  Loading stage at the warehouse, land transportation, port of origin, sea transporta-
tion and port of destination. At every stage within this chain, there are actions or activities 
by different agents, offloading, restaging, reloading, and transshipment. The chain described 
above is not consistently secure and the level of protection offered regarding the containers 
and their contents could be altered while moving from one node to another, and between the 
modes.  If the security at one contact is breached, it compromises the security of the entire 
chain.  Cargo theft remains a problem, even at a situation where there is existence of high-
level security.  The areas that are more vulnerable within the physical process of cargo 
movement have been circled, as shown in figure 3 below. 
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Figure 4  
 
 
The International Container Logistics Chain Vulnerability Assessment: Places in the logis-
tics chain 
Source: (OCDE.Paris: July 2003,24)  
 
2.5.1.2 Actors in the logistics chain 
 
There are several representatives involves in each trade transaction, including individuals 
who involves during loading and transporting of the containers alongside the logistics chain 
shown above. Knowledge regarding exact content, identifying each item, and checking the 
background of individual who comes into contact with the container at the warehouse or dis-
tribution center from which the cargo is transported, becomes a main challenge to govern-
ment agencies and port security guards globally. There are many buyers or manufactures 
globally, and out of these manufactures or buyers, some may ship full container load straight 
away, while others may produce less than container shipments, which must be joint together 
before being transported by sea. From the initial stage of logistics chain before the shipment 
is done, several intermediaries mainly buying agent and/ or freight forwarders between origi-
nating shippers and ocean carriers, who performs various task, ranging from assembling and 
consolidation of less than container load shipment into full containers. Again, when in cargo is 
in transit or in port areas, several workers at the warehousing/staging yard/ within the port 
may have physical access to shipping containers. Among this group of workers, one may have 
criminal or wicked intention to exploit the loopholes within the logistic chain. To succeed in 
this, criminal or terrorist may exploit the loopholes in physical, either through the people or 
procedural security of these facilities.  As show by figure 4 below, loopholes or vulnerability 
could be found in area been circled. 
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Figure 5 
 
 
 
The International Container Logistics Chain Vulnerability Assessment: People/ Actors in-
volved 
Source: (OCDE. Paris: July 2003,25) 
 
 
2.5.1.3 The flow of information/money: bill of exchange 
 
There are many actors in the global trade and some of them have never met physically but 
they are able to transact business based on the exchange of information. Without the secure 
communication of pieces of information, the global trade cannot be possible, due to fact that 
some of them never meet. The content of the information may include the specification of 
the goods to be transported, quantity, number of items on each pallet and into each contain-
er, particulars regarding the custodian one who is liable for the goods, information about the 
delivery date and responsibility for payment, information about the agent of the shipper and 
the receiver and so on. From the above information, every transaction include will be more 
than 10 separate document because some of them may be duplicated. For instance forwarder 
may issue a bill of lading duplicated by the vessel or the carrier. Without the bill of lading, 
the customs and security agencies cannot take a decision on which container to inspect and 
the result from any little manipulation will be very serious. The risk is real, as anyone can 
agree to the fact that, incident of document fraud could be used for cargo theft. Moreover 
most of the information flow in the international trade is still on paper-based, which is costly 
but inefficient. This flow of information /money: bill of exchange is been illustrated through 
figure  (OECD.2003.23-27)  
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Figure 6. Flow of information /money: bill of exchange   
 
 
 
2.6 Supply chain security and its impact on ports operations  
 
It is very important to understand supply chain when dealing with supply chain security. Ac-
cording to Arthur G, Arway (2013, 3), “Supply Chain is a chain of interconnected links that 
facilitates the movement of supplies or in other words cargo, goods, materials, products etc 
According to British Standards Institution (BSI) Group, it combines the traditional supply chain 
management practices with security measures to safeguard business against cargo theft, ter-
rorism and piracy. 
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Though it is the responsibility of every person that gets in contact with the cargo to ensure it 
safety and reduce the risk of the theft, the actual responsibility is upon the shipper. Supply 
chain security policies and procedures, contractual agreement, visibility of every cargo 
movement and the ability to audit compliance with supplier are the very significant to se-
cured supply chain. Nevertheless these steps are often seen as too costly and overburden on 
the shipper. Since the supply chain activities have change from traditional way as result of 
technology, criminals also have changed their activities and their ways of doing things. 
(Burges, D. 2013, 12-15).  According to Thomas Friedman (2007,8), “the interconnected glob-
al economy enabled by advances in Information and Communications Technology and other 
factors that he terms “Flatteners”, does not only empowers the software writers and the 
computer geeks to collaborate on the work in the flat world, but also AL Qaeda and other ter-
rorist networks. Whiles international commerce expands, it also opens opportunities for crim-
inals to infiltrate the supply chain.”  After the attack on USA, supply chain was seen as im-
portant gap in country’s security, as there were panic that criminals could exploit supply 
chain beyond the normal smuggling of product, people, and narcotics. Criminals can smuggle 
weapon of mass distraction and other dangerous chemicals through supply chain. The threat 
of terrorism and other criminal activities serve as a security challenges to supply chain, and 
has a significant consequences on firms and other supplies, customers, carriers, terminal op-
erators, governments and international partners as well. Certainly, the worldwide economy 
depends on how secure and resilient the supply chains are, and the ability of the supply chain 
to withstand and recover from incident, depends on the resiliency of the supply chain. The 
security of the supply chain is paramount as far as the global economy is concerned.  Accord-
ing to Andrew R. Thomas (2010,166) “A resilient supply chain is one that can reduce cost and 
improve customer satisfaction and customer relations under normal supply chain operations, 
while sustaining supply chain operations during major disruptions.” 
 
In dealing with these challenges, several programs have been introduced with the partnership 
of businesses, and governments to secure the supply chain.  For instance; Customs-Trade 
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), World Customs Organization (WCO), and The Europe-
an Union’s Authorized Economic Operators (EU AEO) (Andrew, R. Thomas.2010, 170) 
 
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), and Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
are voluntary initiative by US to tackles diverse aspect of the supply chain security. These 
security Programs focus on distinct aspect of the chain of transportation. The purpose of the 
initiative is to build cooperative relationship, which will boost international supply chain and 
US border security.  
 
WCO – World Custom Organization - is an international organization responsible for customs 
issues. It consists of national Customs administration worldwide.  
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World Custom Organization (WCO) in 2005 adopted SAFE Framework to protect the supply 
chain trade from threat of terrorism. The world Customs Organization (WCO) SAFE framework 
is a to ensure member countries commitment to employ trade security programs like C-TPAT 
which provide benefits to business that apply SAFE-defined standards and best practice   
 
The European Union’s Authorized Economic Operators (EU AEO) program is similar to Custom 
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program. The intention of AEO program is to 
upgrade supply chain security, and at the same time contributing toward facilitating of trade 
reforming and modernizing customs globally.  
 
To establish a framework for supply chain security, the International Standard Organizations 
(ISO) has instituted its ISO 28000:2007 standards, which define procedures, policies and 
mechanism for corporations or organizations to identify the critical parts to the security of 
the their supply chain, and also for managing vulnerabilities as well as establishing preventive 
actions plan. With ISO 28000:2007 supply chain security management standard procedures; 
goods can be protected from the factory to the point of sales. (Andrew R. Thomas .2010, 169) 
 
Why supply chain security is needed in port security operation is obvious from different view-
points. If port security officers and mangers integrate supply chain security into port security 
systems based on ISO standards, it will offer the following benefit: 
First, it will prevent illegal commodity to be intermingled with the shipment, or prevent 
shipment to be used as a weapon or any explosive substance into the port.  
 
Again, trade involving transportation of good across the borders will be facilitated and expe-
dited, which will also enable the management of the port and the security officers easily 
monitor and manage the security risk throughout the business and the supply chain. 
 
Moreover, the port can achieve a completive advantage as well as gaining new business, thus 
encourage the stakeholders of the port, their commitment to safety of individuals and securi-
ty of goods and services. 
 
Notwithstanding the above benefit, port can gain cost of saving via a decline in security inci-
dent and likely minimization of corporate insurance premiums.  
 
2.7 Security and it potential impact on the competitiveness of the port   
 
According to Michael Edgerton (2013, 141) “maritime security cannot be considered in isola-
tion. It affects and is impacted by numerous external factors, including socioeconomic driv-
ers, political priorities, transportation-system linkages, business trends, and international 
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events.” Looking at the complexity of the interactions between the ports, ships, including 
maritime field with other economic interests, logistics, and the mode of transportation, secu-
rity must be perceived as a component of risk management and system resilience. (Michael 
Edgerton.2013, 141). Security regarding port operation must not be seen by it self as a prima-
ry objective, but should be seen as safeguarding safety and efficient port operations and 
trade.  Historically, organizations could construct a secure perimeter around their crucial and 
sensitive business environment and safeguard it again attack from   various viewpoint. With 
the wall and barbwire, anti-virus install on your information technology systems, including 
other physical security, you are well safe. Nevertheless that is not case in the modern-day, or 
environment we live in today. Advancement of technology, which has made it possible for 
remotely access company information, tracking of cargos using technology and so on, means 
the organizations are no longer, and cannot be secured with traditional way of ensuring secu-
rity. Many at times security is perceived as cost centre in the business or commercial envi-
ronment, and sometimes considered as business inhibitor. Nonetheless, if security is incorpo-
rated into daily port operations, it will bring efficiency, and guaranteed resilient security sys-
tem, which 
 
2.8 Benefits of making security an enabler  
 
Incorporating security into daily port operation, where security is perceived as an enabler 
instead of objective, will bring efficiency and effectiveness in safeguarding the companies’ 
assets. Alternatively it will enable the security officers carry out the responsibilities success-
fully. Ultimately the mission and purpose security will clearly be understood by the entire 
organization, and eventually will not be seen as cost centre for business, rather as added val-
ue. For instance, it will prove the value of security department by ensuring that buyers and 
sellers are able to safeguard their shipment via the supply-chain security initiatives.  
 
This could be achieved by vising the site of the suppliers and assesse the mode of operation, 
then develop measures that will positively impact on the efficiency and minimizing organiza-
tional delay such as truck and container movement, ship arrivals as well as minimizing cargo 
theft that could be as a result of security measures. Apart from that, the meaning of security 
could be presented as valuable element of safeguarding the sustainability the organization by 
protection of property, goods and the life of people, including protection of supply-chain in-
tegrity and intellectual property. Also the stereotype mind set people that security is a bur-
den in the organization, heavy-handed, obstacle to free flow of information, goods, and indi-
viduals as well hindrance to business operation, which eventually create bad image for the 
professionals in the security field, will then be changed to positive. (Michael Edgerton.2013, 
142-44)  
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3 Research Methodology   
 
This chapter shall describe research methodology applied in this thesis and the research ques-
tion that this study aims to address. Further explain the study approach, Process of the re-
search, data collection methods, and data analysis methods. Data collection methods include 
both primary and secondary methods.  
 
3.1 Research strategy  
 
This research shall apply case study and qualitative approach as a strategy to identify the 
threats and vulnerabilities. Case study was chosen because it provides and in-depth 
understunding of phenomena , their constructive process and the actors involved . It is said to 
be appropriate for describing , explaining , predicting or controlling process associated with a 
variety of phenomena at the individual , group, and organizational levels.(Yves-
C,Gagnon.2010,2).  
 
Qulitative method is applied to understand and interpret social action. Usually, the objective 
of qualitative metheod is to explore, discover and construct. This method involves analysis of 
data from interviews, images, pictures or object. This type of method is subjective, and uses 
observation, interview and open-eded answers to collect data (Johnson, B. & Christensen, 
L.2008). I used qualitative approach because it will enable me get deeper understanding of 
people the operation, and the activities. 
 
3.2 Reseach Process  
 
Below diagram consists following steps, which shows the whole process of the research; 
 
Figure 7. Research process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
1. Preparation phase   
2. Theoretical Framework  
3. Plan Research Design  
4a.Empirical part 
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In the planning stage, initial examination of various literature sources shall be carried out to 
ascertain the potential problem areas. Define the research problem, objectives, research 
question and delimitation. Phase two is where the review of the literature shall be done to 
ascertain the clearer picture of the potential threats and the vulnerabilities. The outcome of 
the phase two would be used to plan the review, and then research design shall be plan in the 
phase three. This is where the methodology to be applied for the study would be defined. 
Subsequently, analysis of various methodologies, case study research strategy is chosen. The 
fourth stage is practical settings where more detailed process of the empirical part would be 
outlined. Data collected would be examined and compare it to the theoretical part to ascer-
tain the possible threats and vulnerabilities. The last but not the least stage is to develop 
conclusions and recommendations 
 
3.3 Process of Data collection  
 
This part provides the details of the process of data gathering for this research project. Di-
verse methods were been used during investigation for gathering both primary and secondary 
data as presented below.  
 
3.3.1 Primary Research  
 
3.3.1.1 Questionnnaire  
 
I used closed-ended questionnaire to respect the confidentiality of the organizations’ infor-
mation. The questionnaires were given to responders with no possible way of identification, 
and with no sex or age distinction. The questionnaire targeted only Takoradi port, and focus 
was on: ISPS code Documentation, Security Level Coordination and Implementation, Port Fa-
cility Security Officer knowledge and training, Port Facility Personnel with security duties, 
Port Facility Personnel without security duties, Security incident reporting procedures, Drill 
and Exercise requirement, Security Measures for Access Control-Perimeter, Security Measures 
for Access Control –Personnel, Vessels and Port Facility, Security Measures for handling cargo, 
4b. Analysis part 
5. Devising conclusion, preparing the recommendations 
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Security Measures for monitoring ,Safety Measures for handling or storing dangerous  sub-
stances, and the  last but not the least , Communications.   
3.3.1.2 Interview  
 
The expert interviews were conducted on the January 2015, and 4 experts from 2 organiza-
tions partake in the interview. These experts represent Takoradi Port in Ghana and Port of 
Helsinki in Finland. The case company is Takoradi Port, but I used Port of Helsinki for Bench-
marking purpose. Categories of the threats served as a model for the interview as well as a 
basis for the interview.  I used interview when participants cannot be directly observed. The 
interview form was divided into six (6) main categories: security incidents regarding non sea 
borne vulnerabilities to information systems and the technologies, smuggling, stowaway, 
theft, terrorism, and piracy. The aim of the interview was to identify the threat type and the 
likely place for the threat to happen, and to employ appropriate measures to ensure security 
at the Port of Takoradi. Further, the interview aimed to identify vulnerabilities within the 
existing security system at Takoradi Port. 
3.3.1.3  Observation 
 
Applying qualitative approach in a research, there are various ways primary data can be 
achieved. The primary data could be obtained via interviews, conversations, photographs, 
recordings, memos and so on. (Denzin and Lincoln.2003, 4). Using observation as a methodol-
ogy offers more understanding as it can use in ‘natural’ settings, than interviews. Primary 
data for this project was gathered mostly by questionnaire with the main respondents from 
the security department with the Takoradi Port. However, observation also played a role in 
data gathering. “If your research question(s) and objectives are concerned with what people 
do, an obvious way in which to discover this is to watch them do it. This is essentially what 
observation involves: the systematic observation, recording, description, analysis and inter-
pretation of people’s behaviour”. (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill.2009, 288). To better un-
derstand what people do (their roles, actions, and behaviour) and how these can change in 
reaction to situations and over time, observational method are suitable. I used observation to 
explore the vulnerabilities and threat regarding the daily port operations that security offic-
ers found it difficult to articulate. For instances I found that, when interviewed, the security 
officers feel reluctant to divulge certain information for security reasons.   
 
Again, the skills and actions of the security officers or workers without security duties that 
had not been described, and had not have been shown in the interview base-studies were re-
vealed, through observation. For example, how security officers and other workers handles 
customers and their attitude towards corruption. Though interview can be applied to discover 
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the interpretation of ‘actors’ in the field, observation can be critical to exposing people’s 
behaviour and discloses information not found through alternative methods.  
Nevertheless, observation is not only a techniques for difficult circumstances, yet it helpful in 
uncovering the taken-for-granted work of security professionals and other operational staffs.  
 
3.3.1.4 Informal Discussions  
 
To get additional information, informal discussions were assumed with other stakeholders 
within Takoradi Port and some of the port workers, both casual and permanent.   The selec-
tion of these people was on casual bases, because I already knew some of them. Most of the 
discussions took place whiles I was on field assignment during my internship period, and the 
issues was some time about how certain operations were been carried out. The discussion also 
some time concerns the issues regarding my research.  This discussion assisted in verifying the 
feedback received from the distributed questionnaires. Nevertheless, under no circumstances 
was the data/information gathered from the chosen people or informants were intentionally 
or unintentionally shared with anyone during the discussion.  
 
3.3.2 Secondary Data Research  
3.3.2.1 Data Collection 
 
Secondary data consist of both raw data and publish summaries that have been collected by 
organizations and individual, excluding researchers. They are considered as essential element 
in addition to primary data in most social science research. (Saunders, Lewis, and Thorn-
hill.2009, 256). When using case study approach, combining primary data and secondary data 
facilitate in authenticate the results. According to John J. Green (2012) at the state data 
centre of Mississippi, during annual affiliate meeting, stated that mixing both types of data 
offer a practical strategy for conducting efficient and useful assessments and evaluation. 
Taking into account significance of integrating both data, necessary attention is given to sec-
ondary data.  There is multiple numbers of secondary data. (Saunders, Lewis and Thorn-
hill.2009, 258–259). In support of this study, port security regime, Port security rules and reg-
ulation (ISPS Code), published material from recognized agencies, form the bases for the in-
formation analysis. Trusted web-based information is additional sources of secondary data. 
The fact that nearly all organisation and agencies usually publish their information via web-
sites, it was confirmed by Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009, 263–267) that this form of 
media offer a good quality secondary data through several organisations worldwide, whose 
information’s are frequently updated. Based on this, different sources of information have 
been sourced from associated websites, for example; IMO, International Group of P&I club, 
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Ghana Institutes of Freight Forwarders, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforce-
ment Affairs, UNCTAD, etc. 
 
3.3.2.2 Data Analysis 
 
Just after the feedbacks from the questionnaire were received, they were compiled, and 
compared to each other. They were therefore compared to the literature review and most 
relevant ones presented in the results section. The analysis were not only limited to the ques-
tionnaires, but also the existing security measures were physically examine through observa-
tion and informal discussion with security guard and the officers, during the trip to the prem-
ises of the Takoradi Port. Finally, the most relevant information was presented in the finding 
section of this study and recommendations were made based on the findings. 
 
4 Case Company –Takoradi Port 
 
Profile  
Takoradi Port, the older of the two ports in Ghana was built in 1928 as a commercial port to 
handle all types of cargo including containerized cargo. The port is located in Western region 
of Ghana. The industrial district of Sekondi-Takoradi, and is the midway between Accra the 
capital city of Ghana and Abidjan the capital of Côte d’Ivoire. The port is preferred and per-
fect entryway to middle and northern parts of Ghana and landlocked countries in the Sahel 
region of Africa, due to good link to its hinterland. Examples are, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Ni-
ger. The port operates as the main export port for Ghana as the main export port for Ghana, 
as it handled 31% of Ghana’s seaborne traffic, 66% of national export and 19% of national im-
port.  Cocoa, Timber, Bauxite and Manganese are the key export from the port. Primary im-
ports include clinker, wheat, petroleum product and containerized cargo. When Ghana start-
ed commercial quantities of oil in the Western Region of Ghana, because the port is well 
close to the Oil and Gas fields, it supports exploration and production activities at the Oil and 
Gas fields. Most of the oil supply vessels call at the port to load and offload equipment, 
chemicals and other supplies that are warehoused in the port facilities including the sheds 
own by private partners near the port. All the leading shipping lines operated with the port. 
For example; Maersk Ghana Ltd, Hull Blyth, Safe Marine, Super Maritime Ghana Ltd, Panalpina 
Ghana Ltd, Bolore group, Maritime Agencies of west Africa, Baj Freight, GETMA and ISAG and 
others .The port has full range of equipment for all operation alongside other private steve-
doring companies.   
 
Interms of performance, the port started its operation with the initial capacity was 1 million 
tons of cargo, and after the first expansion in 1956, the port was able to handle 1,153 vessels 
with 2.3million tons of cargo in 1964.The port handled 31% of national seaborne traffic, 17% 
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of national seaborne imports, 66% of national seaborne exports, as well as increase in vessel 
calls from 485 in 2003 to 1,664 in the year 2012. This rising occurred as a result of call from 
Oil supply vessels servicing the oil fields at Cape Three Points. From 2007 when the commer-
cial quantity of oil started, the supply vessel calls have increased from 11% to 65%, total traf-
fic from 3.1 million tons of cargo in 2000 to 5.3 million tons in 2012. Exports too have in-
creased from 1.9million tons to 2.9 million tons, whilst import increased from 1.1million tons 
to 2.3 million tonnes within the same period of time. There are different kinds of services 
offered by Takoradi port.      
 
Vessel handling is one aspect of the services Takoradi port offers. The Department of Mari-
time operation wholly handles vessels that call at Takoradi port, as it is the sole responsibility 
of Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority, supervised by the Harbour Master.   
The following are the vessels handling services: 
 
Again, Pilotage activity is available 24/7, and is compulsory for all vessels entering and leav-
ing, as well as shifting berths within the main harbour, and also has modern slipway with 
equipped dry-dock facility to accommodate vessels and crafts up to 400 tons. 
 
The port has Tugs that tow vessels within the main harbour as well as mooring and berthing, 
not excluding tying of ropes and the supply of necessary boats and crew for the purposes of 
mooring and the allocation of berths to vessels. Notwithstanding these, the port supply fresh 
water for vessel at berth, and the rate of supply is 20 tons per hour. 
 
In addition the above mention services, Ghana Ports and harbour Authority Offers stevedoring 
services with other private companies. For cargo handling services, the port authority handles 
only containerized cargo whereas private company handles non-containerized cargo, with the 
exception of bulk cargoes. The port has modern storage facilities with covered area of 
140,000m2 including open storage areas of 250,000m2 with container holding capacity of 5000 
tons. 
Takoradi port has experienced and dedicated clearing and forwarding agents that offer pro-
fessional services on handling of all cargoes via the port.  
Custom Excise and Preventive Services (CEPS): 
The Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA) Customs Division offers services on all Imports and ex-
ports through the port of Takoradi. 
 
The port has Fire and Safety department with well-organized, well-trained, committed and 
dedicated fire – fighting service with modern firefighting equipment. The department offers 
24hour services.  Including these is an excellent security network with skilled operations 
staff, as well as trained and dedicated security personnel to ensure the safety and security of 
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all types at the cargo. Port security department works hand in hand with the National Securi-
ty, Police, The Bureau of National Investigations (BNI) and the Narcotics Control Board. 
Takoradi Port is operating at Security Level 1 (one), and the statement of compliance regard-
ing ISPS code was issued on the 7th June 2004. 
 
 
4.1 Analysis of Existing Security Measures based on media publications and the reports from 
various international organisations   
 
4.1.1 Security Measures: Identity and Credential Verification 
 
Physical security is obviously a significant factor in thwarting illegal activities though, security 
could be evaded, if there are absence of effective measures for issuing credentials and verify-
ing the individual or individual intention, ships or cargo(shipment) arriving at the port. What 
is the usefulness of the strongest lock, if the thieves have the key or the password? Based the 
questionnaire distributed, and personal observation, the entire Port Facility has been fenced 
with concrete wall with barbwire. All entrances are equipped with gates and barricades. Be-
fore one can get access into the port the person must show his or her harbor pass, which is 
small booklet issue to the port users to be able to enter the port. The extent to which these 
measures are actually effective at controlling access by criminal, or other illicit actors is un-
certain. On the 14th December 2014, it was reported in the general news through Ghana 
Webb that, “Two Ghanaian stowaways have been arrested in Spain and have been repatriated 
to Ghana for prosecution. They were brought back to Ghana through the Takoradi Harbour in 
the Western Region.  According to preliminary investigations carried out by the Takoradi Ma-
rine Police, the duo left the West African country through the same port onboard MV Maesk 
Volta.” Another Stowaway incident happened at Takoradi Port, and was reported by City-
fmonline on 17th October, 2014 that, “nine had concealed themselves in a Singaporean ves-
sel, MV Kota Bunga which had come to Takoradi, loaded bauxite and was about to depart to 
China. According to Ghana police, the nine had entered the port and sneaked into the vessel. 
They hide themselves in various places including the anchor hole (area created for the an-
chor). After going through the normal processes before departure, the crew detected some 
human activities and had to conduct a search all over again. Realizing danger the nine came 
out of their holes and jumped into the sea”.  
 
4.1.2 Security Measures: Physical Security  
 
Government of Ghana and Ghana Port and Harbours Authority has invested substantially to 
enhance physical security at Takoradi Port, particularly in the port facilities, by which petro-
leum products are exported. The Government of Ghana perceives it oil infrastructure and 
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port facilities as a strategic asset for the nation, which deserves to be protected by the state. 
The Ghana Ports Harbours Authority in Takoradi have dedicated much of their expenditure on 
security by acquiring different kinds of security gadgets and other technologically advanced 
equipment, as well as CCTV cameras. The Takoradi Port Facilities are protected by concrete 
wall fence with barbwire. All entrances are equipped with gates and barricades. Most of the 
security precautions at Takoradi port are hidden from view. The security infrastructure of 
Ghana Ports and Harbours is linked to all the public security institutions within, and around 
the port for re-enforcement in case of emergency. With trained security personnel’s who can 
effectively respond to threats with new security equipment, yet internal conspiracy among 
the security personnel’s and the staff without security duties, regarding cargo theft   has 
been the major threat for years. The Port Authorities believes with the implementation of 
ISPS code, they had imposed rigorous measures to avoid unauthorised access to the port 
premises or facility. But the ISPS code applies to only the interface of the port facility and 
the ship. The main focus of ISPS code is on external threats and does not address supply-chain 
security issues as a primary concern. As the main attention is on the external threat, it is like-
ly that the internal security system may be vulnerable for internal conspirator to initiate 
criminal activity or terrorist act from inside the fence line of an ISPS-complaint facility.  
 
Moreover, form the critiques regarding ISPS code; it came to notice that it does not apply to 
fishing vessels and vessel with cargo not above 500 tones.  It undeniable fact that Pirate, 
Trafficker of illegal goods (drugs, firearms, etc.) and stowaways can carry out their criminal 
activities through fishing vessels.” (John P. Hogan and Lindsay Chapman. 2005)   
With sufficient number of security personnel’s in and out of the port, as well as regular pa-
trols alongside Marine Police on the anchorage area of the Takoradi port. On the 12th Octber, 
2011 it was reported in Ghana Oil Watch through public News Paper (Daily Graphic) that 
“Crews on board some merchant and supply vessels that call at the Takoradi Port engaged in 
illegal bunkering of large volumes of petroleum products for cash at the Takoradi anchorage. 
The danger, however, is that the perpetrators engage state security personnel in uniform to 
give them cover during their operations.” The pilfering at the ports in Ghana has been a di-
lemma and repeatedly being a key to discouragement in doing business through the ports. For 
many years the threat of pilfering has been increasingly in a complicated trend, and the ports 
authorities find it difficult in their quest to arrest this situation.  The information reaching 
Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority (GPHA) indicates that pilfering is a key problem at the 
ports which negatively impacting the Shipping business and National economy. This prompted 
a research survey to be conducted in 2007 to figure out measures to curb menace. “Among 
the major findings of the research was the involvement of Port security personnel, Port Ter-
minal workers and GPHA drivers involved in the many cases of theft at the ports. The re-
search study was done at both the Tema and Takoradi ports with a sample size of over One 
Hundred and Fifty (150) respondents. 
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Forty percent (40%) of respondents interviewed indicated there was collusion between Port 
security personnel, terminal workers and GPHA drivers in various acts of pilfering at the 
Ports. About fifty-six percent (56%) of respondents indicated that the procedure involved in 
reporting problems regarding pilfering related matters would lead to waste of time. As a re-
sult, this situation served as an incentive for the many pilfering activities at the ports as pro-
cedures for reporting such cases proof counterproductive. Twenty percent (20%) of respond-
ents were not even aware of where to report such issues, compounding the difficulty in re-
ducing the menace further. Fifty-six percent (56%) of respondents were unaware of the pro-
cedures for redress when cargo is lost. This picture creates a very serious affront to the effi-
cient and cost effective operation of the ports.” 
 
The substantial amount of investment made by Government and the GPHA to heighten the 
security system of the port may be undermined by the potential traffickers and others crimi-
nals who will infiltrate either security systems design to protect the port infrastructure or 
institutions associated with maintaining the port infrastructure. The extent, to which the cas-
es regarding the trafficking, cargo theft, and stowaways are linked to the port infrastructure 
and the security systems, proves the effectiveness of the port security system. 
 
The Ghana Government and the Takoradi port authorities have made physical security in port 
an important foundation in every aspect of their port operation.  The development of large 
and competent in source security is another component of the effort. However, regarding the 
allegiance and professionalism of some of the port security staff that has been assigned to 
ensure security at Takoradi Port, raises a question. 
 
4.1.3 Security Measures: Illicit Use of the Port  
 
“The Port of Takoradi is renowned for its excellent security network, with skilled operational 
staff and drilled as well as dedicated security personnel to ensure the safety and security of 
all types of cargo.The security network has further been improved with the installation of a 
closed – circuit television network in the Port. Under this system, cargoes and personnel 
working in the port are safe and secured. The department works hand in hand with the Na-
tional Security, Police, The Bureau of National Investigations (BNI) and the Narcotics Control 
Board.) On the year 2011, Ghana Maritime Authority through Ministry of Transport, secured 
secure a loan of 16,625,835 Euros from Finland, to procure Vessel Traffic Management Infor-
mation System (VTMIS) with the intention of establishing 24 hour electronic surveillance and 
monitoring of Ghana’s coastline as well as Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to safeguard Oil 
terminals, gas pipelines, prevention of illegal fishing, piracy and prevention of ship source 
pollution, including maritime resources as well as offshore installations . The system consist 
of eight (8) Remote sensor site each will have communication Towers and equipped with ma-
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rine radars, Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) and CCTVs for detecting and identifying 
ships and boats. These are in compliance with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
mandated Global Maritime Safety and Distress Systems (GMDSS). Ghana port and harbours Au-
thority is a beneficially of the VTMIS. With all this system in place, yet there are various re-
ports in connection with illicit use of the port for trafficking Drugs. 
 
According to 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, “Ghana continues to be a 
transshipment point for illegal drugs, particularly cocaine from South America and heroin 
from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Europe and United States. Law enforcement officials re-
ported that traffickers are increasingly exploiting Ghana’s relatively unguarded and porous 
maritime border, offloading large shipments at sea onto small fishing vessels, which carry the 
drugs to shore undetected. Some narcotics enter Ghana from other locations in West Africa. 
Narcotics are often repackaged in Ghana and then hidden in shipping containers or secreted 
in air cargo.” From the report, the traffickers exploit both Takoradi and Tema port. “As a 
matter of government policy, Ghana does not encourage or facilitate illegal activity associat-
ed with drug trafficking. Corruption continues to be an issue in Ghana with citizen having 
perception that, corruption is endemic in the police service, as well as in other government 
institutions”. However Ghana Law enforcement is working with neighboring countries on joint 
interdiction efforts to overcome the menace. 
 
Notwithstanding that, the report stated that United State and Ghana Law enforcement U.S. 
and Ghanaian law enforcement is taking pleasure in excellent cooperation on counternarcotic 
by providing technical support to some Ministries and offices in Ghana. Also United States 
funded the formation of West Africa Regional Training Centre in the Capital city of Ghana 
which was open on 2013 as part of the West Africa Cooperation Security Initiative.  
Meanwhile, 2014 NACOB reports stated “the method of transit for drugs is slowly shifting from 
air to land through Ghana’s border with Togo.” This might be as a result-improved security 
measures the port. 
 
 
4.1.4 Security Measures: Supply Chain and Cargo Security 
 
Takoradi facility has an installed gamma ray container scanner to facilitate the clearing of 
containers and improve the quality of services delivered to customers as well as detecting 
illicit material been loaded into the container for shipment. 
 
4.1.5 Terrorism and Tarkoradi Port 
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The information gathered indicates that Takoradi port has never been linked to any case as-
sociated with Terrorism. The level of security at the port has always been at level 1(one) 
 
4.1.6 Port Of Helsinki 
 
For the purpose of benchmarking, the same interview was conducted at Port of Helsinki the 
port security Adviser to ascertain the how security services is being carried out over there.  
Unfortunately, due to security reasons the officer could not divulge the needed information 
which will enable me to do proper benchmarking. Nevertheless some little information was 
ascertained through the interview. Unlike Takoradi port, the major part of the security ser-
vices at the Port of Helsinki has been outsourced to private security company. All the guard-
ing services are being provided by private security. Measure regarding Identity and Credential 
Verification, all the staff and port users must pass through the gate with coded ID cards 
which; they swipe through an electronic reader and then enter the PASSWORD. If you are a 
visitor, the moment you arrived at the reception, after few interrogation by the security 
guard, then he or she will offer you a visitor’s tag after satisfied with your mission, which will 
identify you as a visitor. From few observations and little information ascertained, when it 
comes to security measures, Takoradi has similar efforts to build stronger security for its 
ports. However, the extent to which similar protections is provided by Takoradi port, may 
create vulnerabilities in the port infrastructure security system. 
 
 
4.2 Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this study is to identify the threats and the vulnerabilities and finally recom-
mend measure to overcome the identified threats and vulnerabilities.  
Various categories of potential threats and vulnerabilities have been studied throughout the 
literature review. However, because each port presents a unique sets of threats and vulnera-
bilities, there was a need to look critically into how Takoradi port operations are being con-
ducted in other to identity the potential threats and vulnerabilities pertaining to the said 
port. The result of this study shall be the basis upon which the necessary recommendation 
will be given.  However several researches need to be conducted in order to identify the best 
possible solution to overcome the potential challenges presented by the Port.  
 
This research was based on the following key question:  How to develop resilient security sys-
tem for Takoradi Port?”  
Answer the main question; the following question also came to mind: (ii) has there been any 
security incident linked to Takoradi Port? (ii) If yes, how many time are those incidents linked 
to Takoradi Port? (ii) How do those incidents happen? Are there in place, security measures to 
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prevent those incidents? How effective are these measures, in preventing those security inci-
dents? These prompted me to develop a questionnaire to search for the information regarding 
the existing security control measures, including vulnerabilities and threats associated with 
the security control measured, as well as operational activities within the port.  
Case study methodology was used to research on this research question. The material for this 
research was collected through questionnaires, informal discussion and observation. The 
above mention techniques were used in gathering material for this research though, some of 
the material were also gathered through local media and international institutions’ website.  
 
4.2.1 The current Picture of the security at the port 
 
The feedback from the respondents has demonstrated the strengths and the weaknesses re-
garding the security systems at the Port of Takoradi.  
Looking at face of the feedback, the strength of the security systems falls on the; Security 
Measures For Access Control Personnel, Security Measures For Access Control-Perimeter, 
Security Measures For Delivery Of Ship Stores, Security Measures For Monitoring, and 
Communications systems. Even though there are few area that need to be looked into for 
improvement. For instance, security measures for handling Cargo, and also availability of 
necessary information to the security guards. Because from their responds you could feel that 
though some security systems or measure were in place but when questions were asked some 
could not answer due to lack of information or knowledge.  
 
From the feedback receive from the respondents you could see that the most of the security 
staf have little or no knowledge regarding the ISPS code, which is the new security regime for 
ports and  ships. Again, the feedbacks received from questions under Port Facility personnel 
with security duties regarding adequate and regular security training, the feedbacks got from 
the respondents were conflicting with each other. Some replied no, whiles others replied yes. 
In my opinion, the feedback is an indication that some of the security staff lacks adequate 
security training and education.  
 
Moreover, the feedbacks from the questions under drill & exercise requirements show some 
misunderstanding between drill and exercise on the part of the respondents. From their re-
sponds, drill and exercise are the same. The responds given to the questions regarding drill 
were the same as the responds for the exercise. Meanwhile the scope of the drill is different 
from that of exercise.  
 
Again, there was a question that asked for the last date for drill, and one of the respond stat-
ed that, the last date for the drill was 2011. Meanwhile I distributed the questionnaire at the 
end of April 2014. Some even didn’t give the date at all. This is an indication that the re-
 50 
  
quirement, which stated, drill must be carried out; at least every three month has not been 
carried out accordingly.  An exercise is yearly activity, which includes extensive training in 
which different part of the Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) or Port Security Plan (PSP) are 
practised. During exercise, communication, coordination, availability, resources, as well as 
reactions, is practice and reviewed.  Drill on the other hand, is a small, coordinated practice 
of which, at least one aspect of the Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP) is tested. Normally, drill 
is applied to examine, or test a procedure or a specific function, and serves to keep high level 
of readiness. (European handbook of maritime security exercises and drills, 27). 
In my view, this will produce in inefficiency and ineffectiveness on the part of the security 
force as they try to enforce the existing security measures. It could also serve as potential 
threat to the implementation of the security requirement to prevent criminal or terrorist 
activities.  According to Christopher, K (2014, 68), if the staff responsible port security lack 
adequate training, there is higher possibility for crime and infiltration by internal conspira-
cies.  
 
Furthermore, the feedback received from questions under measures for monitoring the show 
that facility has adequate lighting but the light does not project onto the water/sea. Most of 
the stowaways use the water as their way to get into the ship, and so, if there weren’t any 
light that project onto the water, then, it would be easy for the stowaways to have their way 
into ships easily, due to the darkness on the water or that sea. 
Also from the questionnaires distributed, the feedback shows that security education is not 
extended to non-security staffs.  The more security conscious the employees are, the better 
the effectiveness of the security measures will be achieved. John Leach (2003) observes two 
sets of factors, which changes the employee behavior. The first set comprises user knowledge 
regarding what the company expects from the employee. Second sets include factors that 
empower the willingness of the employee to conduct him or herself within acceptable, ap-
proved standards and practices of the company. According to John Leach (2003), human 
knowledge is based on; what they have been told, what they see practice around them, and 
their past experience. Several companies have documented security policies, practices, 
standards and procedures, however, the effectiveness to influence the security behavior de-
pends on the body of Knowledge accessibility, the completeness of its coverage, clarity of the 
stated security values and its uniformity  
 
Base on personal interaction with the security staff and other employees, it was discovered 
that their attitude toward security very bad. This is because they perceive security as threat 
to their daily operation. Whenever they see security guard around them, the first thing that 
comes into their mind is that, the security guard is there to spy them. This will not bring co-
operation among the security personnel’s and personnel’s without security duties. If such per-
sist, it will always bring unnecessary tension between the security staff and non-security 
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staff, which will not assist in providing adequate security measures, because risk analysis will 
always be based on assumption due to lack of cooperation. It came to realisation that non-
security staffs lack adequate information about security in relation to their work.   
 
Apart from the weaknesses identified through the questionnaire, the material gathered 
through the local media and international institutions reveal some pothole  in the security 
systems operated in Takoradi port.  
 
Considering the stowaway and drug trafficking cases that have been linked to the Port of Ta-
koradi, there is no doubt that the security system within Tarkoradi port is weak and leaky. 
Even though according to 2014 NACOB reports “the method of transit for drugs is slowly shift-
ing from air to land through Ghana’s border with Togo.” Which did not mention Takoradi 
port, yet it doesn’t mean the port is immune to drug trafficking, because the human factor 
within the security system has not been removed. 
 
The difficulties of the security cannot be isolated from broader security context. Even though 
there may be stringent checks point in and around Takoradi Port. The Management of Takora-
di port may have purchase the best security technologies that money can afford, trained their 
employees so well that they secure all their facilities, including what is contain in the facili-
ty, locked every access before going home, and have well train security staffs to guard the 
port premises and the facility, yet the port is still vulnerable. The port users and other indi-
viduals may follow the best and required security practice recommended by the ISPS Code 
and other security experts, installed the needed security products with complete vigilant re-
garding the security systems, individuals are still vulnerable. Why? According to Kevin D. Mit-
nick &William L. Simon (2002), “the human factor is truly security weakest link. One of the 
world’s most renowned scientists of the twentieth century, Albert Einstein said, “Only two 
things are infinite, the universe and human stupidity. But what is much more prevalent than 
the real stupidity is living stupid, closing your ear, not listening and not seeing 
Criminal can infiltrate the security system and succeed when people are corrupt or ignorant 
regarding good security practice. With similar attitude, as how security-conscious the em-
ployees and management of Takoradi Port may be, it a mistaken belief that the port is largely 
protected from attack or cannot be infiltrated by criminal because they have set up standard 
security products – CCTV systems or strong authenticated device such as biometric smart 
cards. If anyone thinks, security products alone offer true security, that person is deceiving 
him or herself in term of security.  Such people should anticipate for future security incident. 
According to Security consultant Bruce Schneier (2008), “Security is not a product, it’s a pro-
cess.” Moreover security is not a technology problem it’s a people and management problem. 
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The results of the study show that there is; in adequate education and knowledge regarding 
ISPS Code. Requirement of Drill and Exercises are not been followed. Base on the report from 
local media and internal institutions, though terrorism is perceived to be non-existence in the 
Takoradi port, the other maritime crime particularly, stowaway, trafficking of illicit drugs 
and cargo theft still remain. These threats are gaining their root in the port, because the sys-
tem through which individual credentials and identity as well as individual intention are being 
verify, proves ineffective. This is because integrity of some of the law enforcement agencies 
and security personnel including personnel’s without security duties may have been compro-
mised. I therefore propose the following measures to be applied. 
 
4.3 Recommendations  
 
4.3.1 Preventing Theft And Other Criminal Activities 
 
Individual criminal motive alone cannot be amount to a crime without opportunity and the 
means. All (motive, opportunity and means) need to come to together for crime to happen. 
Individual motive cannot be controlled, means is difficult to control, but opportunity can be 
controlled. So the security measure must focus on the opportunity to minimise it as much as 
possible to affect the final result.  Necessary measures must be put in place to make sure 
those opportunities, which will encourage crime, is reduced. If the opportunities for the at-
tack or criminal activities are minimized considerably, then the criminal will be discouraged 
from focusing on the port facility, person or the infrastructure being protected. 
 
4.3.2 Extensive or Adequate education on ISPS Code 
Feedback receive from the respondents shows that the most of the security staf have little or 
no knowledge regarding the ISPS code, which is the new security regime for ports and  ships. 
Therefore, there is the need for the security personnel to be educated extensively on the ISPS 
code.  
 
4.3.3 Training, Drill And Exercises 
 
Though security exercise could be practiced on the managerial level and the operational level 
with the port facility, nevertheless, when operational level and the managerial level are join 
together, it has a great benefit, since it will assist management to recognise the security 
loopholes throughout the entire levels within the organization, and as a result of that, wider 
support will be welcome for improvement.   Moreover, it will enable the security manage-
ment team to prepare the needed programs and the security measure to fix the loopholes.  
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4.3.4 Stowaway  
 
The danger that comes as a result of stowaway incident affects all the stakeholders (port, 
ship, and maritime industries including the image of the country. Shipping companies have 
shown more concerned regarding the high cost and risk from stowaway.  If the shipping lines 
keep on paying penalty on stowaway incidents, the will lose interest in transacting business 
through the said port.  If such happened, the income of the port will be decreased. Automati-
cally, every one that depends on the port for a living will be negatively affected.  Fighting 
against the threat of stowaway must be welcome by all the stakeholders regarding maritime 
commerce.  
There is possibility that, stowaway incident will be getting worse in the coming years, should 
current global economic problems persist. For instance, areas like Africa.  
Hence, comprehensive and effective stowaway search and procedures should be applied to all 
ships that enter Takoradi port before the ship leaves the port. As part of quarterly drill pro-
gram stowaway search should be included on potential stowaway target vessels or ships. This 
include the following steps:  
 
First, stowaway search list should be divided into sections for orderly search, before it leaves 
the port. Sufficient time must be allowed for stowaway search, and there should be acknowl-
edgement from the Master showing his satisfaction regarding the search. 
 
Secondly, Port authority should employ a permanent Gangway for the Ganway operation, and 
also huge amount of penalty for all the security officers and guards, not exluding all workers 
on duty that give way for stowaway, during discharging and loading. 
Inaddition to the above mentions measures, there must be regular patrol both anchorage and 
with the port. 
 
Moreover there should be documented terms and condition to be complied by the agents and 
security staff on duty, whilst the ship is in port be held liable for all cost of disembarkation 
and repatriation, if it discovers later that the stowaway have managed to on board the ship or 
vessel from Takoradi Port.   
 
Last but not the least, to motivate the angents and the security staff to be more vigilant 
while on duty, the agents and security staff should be rewarded for stowaway free sailing. 
 
4.3.5 Controlling Illicit Drug Trafficking  
 
Controlling illicit drug traffickers and the criminals from exploiting port; the stringent 
measures are needed to enforce immigration rules concerning merchant seamen and passen-
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gers’ access to the port facility. I suggest the following measures to be carrying out to control 
the illicit use of the port for drug trafficking and criminal activities through the port. 
 
In the first place, port operators and individuals working or accessing the port must be go 
through thought investigation check before allowing them to access the port 
 
Secondly, Cargo should be presented 24h hour before loading, for necessary inspection to be 
done. 
Thirdly, Loading operations should be re-programmed, and then security staff be trained to 
deal with container inspection.  
 
Further, container platform or yard surveillance technology programs should be developed 
and implemented to improve security throughout the entire supply chain by inspecting the 
identity of all players concerning the supply chain to safeguarding the integrity of the port 
premises the supply chain. 
 
Access control is crucial while vessel(s) is or are in port, and for that matter all the person on 
board be identified, and also ensure that seals are fastened on all the loaded containers. 
4.3.6 Ensuring Integrity and Countering Corruption 
 
All the stakeholders must be made to understand the importance of the integrity of the sys-
tem, which is being protected from internal threats as the key component for evaluating the 
security measures. To combat internal threats, there should be a process to assess the trans-
parency of the every operation and activities that concerns the port. There should be contin-
uous interaction among all the players within the port to make sure every activity is being 
carried out appropriately, and that corruption is not allowed. 
 
Furthermore, application of human resource management activities to improve the opera-
tion’s competitive position, through recruitment and development of competent employee 
and managers, via development of staffing plans, and must be a key contributor to their eco-
nomic success.  
 
4.3.7 Cost  
   
Regarding the cost aspect, there is the need for partnership and cooperation among Ports and 
Governments within West Africa sub-region, in relation to information sharing, capacity build-
ing, technical assistance, and financial support, through the establishment of a funding plan 
to raise fun from public to enable the ports to ease financial burden, which will also create 
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opportunity for the port within the sub-region to build a strong security network, to enable 
authory to track down the criminal and stowaways menace.  
 
4.4 Future research  
 
Human factor as a threat to the implementation of Port security measures is still not fully 
studied and need further exploration despite the fact that within past few years there has 
been emphasis on corruption and espionage from the point of security threat. Considering the 
threats and vulnerabilities regarding port security, human factor cannot be overlooked, when 
implementing security measures or safeguards. This is because human factor can serve as an 
obstacle to the successful implementation of the security measures. Preventing internal 
threat to security is one of the most challenging and complex task facing security and law 
enforcement within the port, because of employees’ unique access to vessels and the infra-
structure with the port. According to Kevin D. Mitnick &William L. Simon (2002), “the human 
factor is truly security weakest link. One of the world’s most renowned scientists of the twen-
tieth century, Albert Einstein also said, “Only two things are infinite, the universe and human 
stupidity. 
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Appendixes 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
International Ships And Port Security (Isps) Code Documentation 
 
Q1a).   Does facility have an approved Port Facility Security Plan (PFSP)? YES/NO    
  
Q1b). How often is the PFSP reviewed?  
 
Q2). Was facility issued a statement of compliance/plan Approval?  
 
 
ü Security Level Coordination & Implementation 
 
Q4). At what security level is the terminal operation? 
 
Q5). Can you explain the different between security levels 2&3? 
 
Q6). Who sets faciltiy’s secirity level?  
 
Q7). What are the major changes to the security of the facility as the security level increas-
es? 
 
Port Facility Security Officer Knowledge & Training 
 
Q8). Has the PFSO received appropriate training to fulfil his/her responsibilities? Yes/No 
 
ü Port Facility Personnel With Security Duties 
 
Q9a). Do facility personnel with security duties receive regular security training?  YES/NO 
   
Q9b). I, how often does does the security personnel receive regular security training? 
 
Q10). Do facility personnel receive regular training in-house? Yes /No  
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Q11). Do facility personnel receive regular training off-site? Yes/ No 
 
Q12). Are records maintained to document training and exercises? Yes/ No 
   
 
 
ü Port Facility Personnel Without Security Duties 
         
Q13). Did facility personnel without security duties receive initial ISPS Code training? Yes/NO 
       
Q14a).  Do facility personnel without security duties receive regular ISPS Code training? Yes / 
No   
 
Q14b). If yes, how often: 
 
Q15). Do facility personnel attend in-house security training? Yes / No 
  
Q16). Do facility personnel attend off -site security training? Yes / No  
  
Q17). Are new personnel indoctrinated with all relevant with all relevant security measures? 
Yes / No  
 
Q18). Are records maintained to document training and exercise? Yes/No 
 
         
ü Drill & Exercise Requirements  
 
Q19a). Are drills conducted at least every 3 months?   Yes/ No  
 
Q19b). Date /Type of Last Drill: 
 
Q19c). Who participates? 
 
Q20). Are exercises conducted each calendar year, with no more than 18 months between 
exercises? Yes / No 
 
Q20a. Date/Type of Last Exercise:  
 
Q20b).  Who are the participants? 
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Q21). Are records of drills and exercises maintained? Yes/ No 
  
Q22). To whom is the result of drills and exercises reported to?  
 
 
 
ü Security Measures For Access Control-Perimeter 
 
Q23). Does a fence or wall surround the entire facility? Yes/ No 
 
Q24). Is the fence clear of debris/ Vegetation? Yes /No 
 
Q25). How many access gates does the facility have? Yes / No 
 
Q26). Are there separate access gate/ portals for pedestrians and vehicles? Yes / No 
 
Q27). Are all entrances equipped with gate or barricades? Yes/ No 
 
Q28). Are guards posted to all access point? Yes / No 
 
Q29). Is all access point equipped with appropriate warning signs?  Yes/ No 
 
 
ü Security Measures For Access Control –Personnel 
 
Q3a). Describe access control procedures for employees (badges, etc.). 
 
Q31b). If access cards are issued, are they: 
Colour-coded? Yes/No 
 
 
Q31c). Include a photograph of the employee? Yes/No   
 
Q31d) Have expiration date? (ID expires – month/ years from issue) Yes/ No 
 
31e,) does the card include biometric info?  Yes/No  
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Q31f). Is the card connected to an electronic card reader system? Yes/ No 
   
Q31g). Do all employees have access cards? Yes / No    
 
Q32a). Are background checked conducted before access card are issued? Yes/No 
  
Q32b) which people conducts the background checks? 
 
Q33). Are ship crewmembers allowed ashore? Yes / No   
 
Q34). Are ship crewmembers screened by immigration? Yes / No 
 
Q35). Does the facility have segregated areas for embarking/disembarking passengers? 
Yes/No    
 
Q36). Describe the passenger screening process 
 
Q37). Are vehicle screened prior to entering the facility? Yes/ No 
   
Q38a). Do government agencies have access to screen baggage?  Yes / No  
  
 
Q38b). If yes, who are the agencies? 
 
Q39). Do security personnel control access to restricted areas? Yes/No 
 
ü Vessels(Passenger and Vehicle) & Cruise Ship Terminals Only 
 
Q40). Does the facility have segregated areas for embarking/disembarking passengers? Yes 
/No  
 
Q41). Are accompanied baggage’s screened priors to entry into the facility? Yes/ No  
 
Q42). Are vehicles screened prior to entering the facility? Yes/No 
  
Q43a). Do government agencies have access to screen baggage? Yes/No 
Q43b). If so, what agencies?  
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ü Security Measures For Handling Cargo  
 
Q44). Describe method for screening truck drivers:  
 
Q45). Describe methods for screening cargo vehicles 
 
Q46). Is x-ray equipment used to screen cargo?  Yes/No 
 
 
ü Security Measures For Delivery Of Ship Stores 
 
Q47). Are ship stores received at the facility? Yes/No 
   
 
Q48). Are vendors and ship stores screened prior to entering facility? Yes/No 
   
Q49). Is advance notification of deliveries required? Yes/No 
   
Q50). Are vendors supervised while delivering ship stores? Yes/No  
 
Q51). Is there a separate storage area for ship stores? Yes/ No 
   
Q52a). Do government agencies have access to screen ship stores? Yes /No  
   
Q52b).   If yes, what agencies? 
 
ü Security Measures For Monitoring 
 
Q53). How is the landside of the facility monitored?  
 
Q54). Does the facility have a CCTV system?  Yes / No   
 
Q55). How much of the facility does the CCTV system cover?  
 
Q56). Are the CCTV cameras monitored at all times? Yes /No  
 
Q57a). Are CCTV recordings stored? Yes/No  
 
Q57b). How long? 
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 Q58). Are stored CCTV recordings protected with restricted access? Yes/No  
 
Q59). Does the CCTV system have a secondary (backup) power source? Yes/No  
 
Q60). What procedure to follow if the cameras suddenly fail at night?  
 
Q61). Does facility have an effective plan for limiting waterside access? Yes /No  
  
Q62). How often are waterborne patrols conducted?  
Answers from the respondents: 
 
Q63). Does facility have signs facing the water stating that access is restricted? Yes/ No 
    
Q64). Does facility maintain one or more waterside patrol boat(s)? Yes/ No  
  
 Q65). Are guards maintained on docks at all times when ships are in port? Yes/ No  
    
Q66). Does the facility have any anchorages or berthing areas? Yes/No  
    
Q67). Does the facility have a plan to monitor these areas? Yes/No  
 
 
Q68). Does the facility have a means to access a vessel in their anchorage? Yes/No 
  
Q69). Does the facility have adequate lighting?  
 
i) At access point? Yes /No 
    
ii) At the pier/ship-port interface areas? Yes/No   
 
iii) Projected onto the water? Yes/No  
 
Q70). Do the lights have a secondary (backup) power source? Yes/ No  
    
 
ü Communications 
Q71). Do all guards have communication devices (radios/phones)? Yes/ No 
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Q72). Do facility guard/employees share radio frequencies with law enforcement? Yes/No
   
Q73). Do radios and phones have an emergency backup power source? Yes/ No  
    
Q74). Does each active facility access point provide a means of contacting police, security 
control, or an emergency operations centre? Yes /No 
   
Q75a). Does facility hold periodic port security meetings?  
 
Q75b). If yes, who are the participants? 
 
Q75c). How many times do they meet?  
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